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EMPOWERMENT THROUGH
RESTRAINT: REVERSE PREEMPTION OR
HYBRID LAWMAKING?
Laura E. Littlet

ABSTRACT
In the jurisprudence of federal jurisdiction, we often observe
federal courts exerting power and control under the banner
of restraint and deference to states and to other branches of
the federal government. This Article explores two examples of
this empowerment technique, in which the United States
Supreme Court deployed federal judicial power to resolve
choice of law questions. The examples come from diverse
contexts: foreign affairs and bankruptcy. In both contexts, the
Roberts Court acted in the name of respect for state
prerogatives, but bestowed on itself and other federal judges
considerable latitude to determine the outcome of suits.
The foreign affairs illustration of this "negative"
empowerment technique is the Supreme Court's 2008
decision in Medellin v. Texas. Framed as a choice of law
case, Medellin presented the choice between state procedural
default rules and treaty provisions interpreted by the
International Court of Justice. The bankruptcy illustration
tProfessor of Law and James E. Beasley Chair in Law, Temple University School of
Law. Copyright held by Laura E. Little 2009. 1lam indebted to Professors Margaret Howard and
Jonathan Lipson for sharing their bankruptcy expertise, Professors Peter Spiro and Peggy
McGuinness for sharing their international law expertise. Professor Craig Green for sharing his
thoughts on the federal jurisdiction issues in this project, and to my research assistants Alice Ko
and Daniel Tyman. This project was made possible by funds from The Clifford Scott Green
Chair and Research Fund in Law.
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derives from a line of cases beginning with Butner v. United
States and analyzing the choice between state law and federal
bankruptcy law. In both illustrations, the Supreme Court
named state law as the "winner."
Beyond showing how the Supreme Court's choice of law
analysis empowers the federal judiciary, this Article also
explores how the Medellin and bankruptcy cases add to a
growing body of hybrid law. Working within the confines of
federal principles, the Court allowed other sovereignties
(states) to provide meaningful contributions to federal
regulation and thereby successfully navigated a permeable
line between state and federal law. This bodes well for the
future of hybrid lawmaking in general. Might the Court's
approach also provide an upbeat message for debates about
whether United States courts should integrate international
and transnationalprinciples in their decisionmaking?
INTRODUCTION

Behold the hand of restraint. It works in unexpected ways. What is
billed as restraint and deference can operate as power and control. We
witness this often in the federal courts area. Abstention and standing
doctrines are common, easy examples. We have long seen how, using
these doctrines under the banner of judicial restraint, the United States
Supreme Court has influenced-and in some cases arrested-the
development and enjoyment of federal guarantees.' I explore here two
more recent examples of this technique, in which the Supreme Court
deployed federal judicial power to resolve legal issues broadly
characterized as choice of law questions. In resolving the choice of
law questions, the Supreme Court acted in the name of respect for
state prerogatives. Yet by deferring to state authority, the Court
bestowed on itself and other federal judicial officers considerable
latitude to determine the outcome of suits.
Many have remarked on the Roberts Court's apparent tendency to
find federal preemption of state regulation.2 For Justices who usually
ISee, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the
Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 115 (1984) ("[ludicial lawmaking through abstention can
very directly undermine [a carefully structured federal statutory] goal."); Maxwell L. Steams,

Standing at the Crossroads: The Roberts Court in Historical Perspective, 83

NOTrRE DAmE L.

REV. 8715, 881 (200(8) (providing a detailed look at how the United States Supreme Court has
"transformed standing doctrine to control the conditions of developing constitutional doctrine").
2 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts court at Age Three, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 947, 968
(2008) ("Every preemption case decided so far by the Roberts Court has been decided in favor
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champion states' rights, this support for expansive federal authority
might be surprising. Allowing state law to flourish, one might argue,
dovetails most closely with a world view giving dominance to state
sovereignty.3 But, in fact, federal power plays are not reserved to
those cases in which federal actors affirmatively stake out areas of
federal domain. Dominance does not always come in positive form.
Indeed, through negative constraint-apparently withholding federal
regulatory power-the Roberts Court has reinforced federal
prerogatives, at least those enjoyed by the federal judicial branch
4
through doctrinal development.
My two illustrations for this negative approach come from diverse
contexts: foreign affairs and bankruptcy. While the foreign affairs
illustration-Medellin v. TexaS5 -has already been widely associated
67
with preemption, the bankruptcy illustration has not. Framed as a

of finding preemption. All have involved business challenges to state and local regulations on
the grounds of preemption by federal law." (footnote omitted)); Term in Review-Civil Cases:
Landmark Constitutional Opinions, Pro-Business Rulings Characterize Tenn, 77 U.S. LAW
WEEK 3033, 3035 (July 22, 2008) [hereinafter Term in Review] (quoting Seth Waxman
describing finding of preemption "somewhat surprising" in 2008 cases); David G. Savage,
Trumping the States: Business Is Finding Success in Federal Pre-emption Cases, ABA J., May
2008, at 26 (describing pro-business benefits of United States Supreme Court's business
jurisprudence); Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TiMES, March 16, 2008, (Magazine),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/magazine/16supreme-t.htrl? (reviewing the
exceptionally pro-business orientation of recent Supreme Court cases). The Roberts Court's
record reflects trends similar to those of the Rehnquist Court. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff &
Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1431 (2006)
(observing the Rehnquist Court's expansive view of preemption, even in view of its "billing as
staunch protector of states' rights").
3Erwin Chemerinsky's theory is that conservative Justices are voting to protect strong
business interests, presumably undaunted by the federalism implications of their votes.
Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 972 ("Preemption issues create an opportunity for an unusual
coalition between more liberal Justices, like Stephen Breyer, who favor more expansive national
power, and conservative Justices, like Antonin Scalia and John Roberts, who are strongly probusiness." (footnote omnitted)).
4 The Roberts Court's assertion of federal court power is also arguably at odds with
conservative horizontal separation of powers rhetoric found in recent opinions. See, e.g.,
Boumnediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2279-80 (2008) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (complaining
that the majority opinion in the case was not about the decision's specific consequences, but
"1about control of federal policy" and shifting "responsibility for ... sensitive foreign policy and
national security decisions from the elected branches to the Federal Judiciary").
5128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
6See, e.g., Term in Review, supra note 2, at 3038 (describing Medellin as "effectively yet
another preemption case"); see also Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1377 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(describing the critical question in the case as "whether the Supremacy Clause requires Texas to
follow, i.e., to enforce, [the] ICJ judgment").
As for what constitutes "preemption," Kevin Clermont provides the following helpful
summary:
Premption ... is an ill-bounded constitutional doctrine that invalidates state law if it
interferes with federal law. Although preemption tends to focus on displacement of
state substantive law by congressional statute, judges and commentators recognize
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choice of law case, Medellin presented the choice between treaty
provisions (as interpreted by the International Court of Justice) and
state procedural default rules. The bankruptcy cases present the
choice between state and federal bankruptcy laws. In both contexts,
the Supreme Court named state law as the "winner."
Part of this Article's goal is to demonstrate how in fact federal
authority was much more the "winner" in these cases than the
Supreme Court let on. I will show how-as in other instances where
federal authority regulates through deference-these recent choice of
law decisions empower a strong federal judiciary. But my purpose
transcends simply characterizing cynically the Supreme Court's
choice of law analysis as a means of flexing federal judicial muscle.
Rather, I seek an upbeat, durable message grounded in the
observation that both of these diverse contexts (foreign relations and
bankruptcy) prompted the Supreme Court to add to a growing body of
hybrid law. Working within the confines of federal principles, the
Court allowed other sovereignties (states) to provide meaningful
contributions to federal regulation. What is often glibly regarded as a
strict boundary separating state and federal legal principles did not act
as a strict boundary at all. In both contexts, the Supreme Court
navigated a permeable line between state and federal law without
apparently derogating federal sovereignty or identity.
Whether or not one agrees with the ultimate result of Medellin and
the bankruptcy cases, federal judicial control of the doctrine
governing the relevant subject matters remained intact. Might this
provide a reassuring message for debates about whether United States
courts should integrate international and transnational principles in
their decisionmaking? Even if skeptical judges are not persuaded by
this message, the case studies here provide lessons that inform
scholarly projects advocating hybrid legal regulation. I take up these
issues at the end of this Article. First, however, I lay the groundwork
by reviewing Medellin, the bankruptcy cases, and their jurisprudential
qualities. Only then do I reckon with controversies surrounding

that it can displace state procedural law too, and that it can occur by federal
administrative act or even by the effect of federal common law. Preemption can be
express or implied; and implied preemption can trump a state provision that conflicts
by di scrim-i nation against or contradiction to federal law or stands as an obstacle to
federal law, or can authorize federal law to occupy exclusively a whole field...
Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
7The bankruptcy illustration comes from the confluence of three cases, only one of
which was actually rendered by the Roberts Court: Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of America v. Pac.
Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443 (2007); Cent. Va. Cmty. Coil. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006); and
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979). 1Ifocus primarily, however, on the Travelers case.
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hybrid lawmaking and the role of foreign and international law in
United States adjudication.
1. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND BANKRUPTCY CASE STUDIES: RANDOM
SAMPLES OR FEDERALISM ALLIES?

On initial impression, the case studies analyzed here could hardly
seem more different. Medellin v. Texas was a criminal case that came
before the Supreme Court as part of its power to review state court
decisions. Medellin presented a public law matter, implicating
principles of federalism, foreign affairs, and international issues, as
well as questions of horizontal separation of powers among the
federal government's branches. The bankruptcy cases, on the other
hand, came to the Supreme Court exclusively from the federal court
system and concerned private law disputes between debtors and
creditors, implicating technical areas of insolvency where few but
expert practitioners dare to tread. For my purposes here, the two case
studies nonetheless both illustrate common dilemmas raised when
state law clashes with other potential laws that might govern a
controversy. In both case studies, the Supreme Court chose the same
resolution: allow state law to control, but only under circumstances
carefully controlled by federal judicial authority.
While I am cautious in making sweeping analogies between the
two contexts, 8 I note their shared pedigree. Indeed, concerns related to
both bankruptcy and foreign affairs served as significant catalysts for
the framing of the Constitution. For foreign affairs, the Framers
sought to remedy deficiencies in the Articles of Confederation that
enabled the states to undermine effective national foreign policies.9
8 Cf. Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards a Constitutional Theory of
Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 605. 611 (2008) ("Bankruptcy exceptionalism has been an
operating principle in the creation and development of the bankruptcy power since the
Framing.").
9See, e.g., CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MAY TO SEPTEMBER

1787, at 131-35 (1966) (explaining

that the Framers were greatly motivated by fears regarding foreign influence over individual
states and acknowledgment of a need to participate in foreign politics to engage in international
commerce); Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power to "Define and
Punish... Offenses Against the Law of Nations," 42 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 447, 462-78 (2000)
(stating that a major impetus behind drafting the Constitution was a need to establish federal
government's ability to enforce international law); id. at 464 n.53 (emphasizing the Framers'
determination to integrate international law into the law of the nation, as they "'viewed
adherence to international law as a concomitant to sovereignty"' (quoting Jules Lobel, The
Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and InternationalLaw, 71
VA. L. REV. 1071, 1084 (1985))); Anna von Franqud, Comment, Pineapples, Presidentsand the
Federal Courts: A Defense of the Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations and a New
Framework for its Application, 35 Sw. U. L. REv. 253, 267-68 (2006) (stating that the Framers
were primarily motivated by a desire to address deficiencies in the Articles of Confederation,
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Likewise, the Framers may have established Congress's Bankruptcy
Power in response to pro-debtor actions that were allowed to flourish
under the Articles.' 0 For both subject matters, the Framers acted with
deep awareness of the ramifications for federal and state sovereignty.
One would therefore expect that a similar approach to federalism
should inform choice of law decisions in both contexts. Although the
two contexts represent apparently random samples of case law from
the Roberts Court, they presented the Court with opportunities to treat
similarly the relationship between state and federal laws. That is, in
fact, what occurred.
A. ForeignAffairs: Medellin v. Texas
Medellin v. Texas is an enormously important decision, rich in its
ramifications for law and politics. The case revealed the Roberts
Court's approach to treaty interpretation as well as its response to
assertions of presidential prerogative on foreign affairs matters. More
importantly for purposes here, Medellin presented a chance for the
Supreme Court to declare that state law trumps United States treaty

especially in the arena of implementing effective foreign policy); see also Itel Containers Int'l
Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 76 (1993) (reasoning that Congress was given exclusive
power over imposing duties and tariffs on imports because of the Framers' view that it was
important for the nation to "speak with one voice" when regulating intemnational commercial
relations, given the possible effect on foreign relations (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v Wages,
423 U.S. 276, 285-86 (1976))); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534, 55556 (1959) (describing the Framers' view that federal control over foreign economic relations
and speaking with "one voice" internationally also serves as an instrument to protect domestic
manufacturing); THE FEDERALIST Nos. 3, 4, at 20, 24-25 (John Jay) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898)
(stating that reserving foreign relations powers to the federal govemnment is the best way to
maintain peace with other nations and provide an effective defense), No. 42, at 231-33 (James
Madison) (explaining that vesting federal government with the exclusive power to deal with
foreign nations is superior to the system under the Articles of Confederation).
50Little is actually known about the history of the Bankruptcy Clause in the Constitution.
See, e.g., Lipson, supra note 8, at 625. As a threshold point of interpretation, however, it is
significant that, at the time of the Constitutional Convention, America was suffering from a
post-war financial collapse. See MERILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES DURING THE CONFEDERATION 178 1-1789, at 187-92 (1950) (detailing the economic
troubles of the newly independent colonies under the Articles of Confederation). The increasing
debtor class was exercising its power, leading many state legislatures to pass pro-debtor laws,
including those that abolished imprisonment for debtors and allowed debtors to use land as
payment. In addition to the state legislatures, state courts responded to pressure from debtors,
showing prejudice against out of state creditors. See CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

28 (1913). This practice

worried the Federalists who were aligned mostly with the creditor interests. See Patrick J.
Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New
World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 Tax. L. REV. 79, 94 (1993) (discussing thc cuncern the
Federalists had for state legislative prejudice against out of state debtors). One of the proposals
the Federalists made in response to this concern was the Constitution's Bankruptcy Clause,
giving to Congress the power to establish bankruptcy laws.
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obligations as interpreted by an international tribunal and the
President of the United States."1 Characteristically for cases with
choice of law implications, Medellin was not accompanied by
significant attention in the public and press; that attention was
devoted instead to other blockbuster constitutional cases from
October Term 2007. 12 Even among legal scholars, my
characterization of Medellin as a choice of law decision is unusual.
Medellin concerned a Mexican death row inmate who, at the time
of his arrest and trial, had not been told by Texas authorities of his
right to speak to his home consulate-a right guaranteed under the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. 13 Medellin did not raise
this Vienna Convention claim at his trial or on direct appeal, thus
triggering state procedural default rules preventing him from raising
the claim on collateral review. 14 In related litigation after the United
States had signed onto the Vienna Convention, the International Court

of Justice

(",ICJ",) 15

issued an opinion in Case Concerning Avena and

Other Mexican Nationals ("Avena"). Avena held that that the Vienna
Convention bound individual states of the United States to the treaty's
requirement to apprise prisoners of their right to speak to their
consulate. 16 The ICJ further held that certain Mexican nationals
My emphasis is one of many possible perspectives on the decision. For example, in
contrast to my approach, one commentator argues that Medellin is more about "the horizontal
allocation of power between the executive and [the) legislat[ure] [than about the] vertical
allocation of power between federal and state governments." Robert B. Ahdieh, Foreign Affairs,
InternationalLaw, and the New Federalism: Lessons from Coordination,73 Mo. L. RFV.- 1185,
1198 (2008). Another commentator captures the richness of competing perspectives on Medellin
by identifying three separate narratives informed by the decision: an intemnallconstitutionalist
narrative, an extemal/intemationalist narrative, and a transnationallintersystemnic narrative.
Margaret E. McGuinness, Three Narratives of Medellin v. Texas, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.
Ray. 227 (2008). My focus here is most closely aligned with the intemallconstitutionalist
narrative. See id. at 234 ("The IntemnallConstitutionalist narrative frames the issue of America's
interaction with international law from the inside looking out. It adopts a vocabulary reflecting
the history, internal struc~tures, and jurisprudential traditions of the Constitution.").
12 Despite eluding the attention of the press and public, the case has become something of
a law professor's darling. Well, perhaps "whipping boy" is more apt, since the affection applies
not to its result, but for its endlessly fascinating legal issues. The two constitutional cases likely
receiving the most press attention during that term were District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.
Ct. 2783 (2008) (interpreting the Second Amendment) and Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229
(2008) (adjudicating the constitutionality of Congress's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
for Guantanamo detainees). See generally Noah Feldman, When Judges Make Foreign Policy,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, (Magazine), at 50, 56 (stating that although equally "important to
defining our constitutional era" as Bonmediene, Medellin "garnered little public attention").
'3 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1354 (2008).
14 Id. at 1355.
15 The ICJ is established pursuant to the United Nations Charter to adjudicate disputes
between member states. In this litigation. Mexico brought a claim against the United States.
alleging violations within the United States of the Vienna Convention.
16 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), 2004
I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31), 2004 WL 2450913.
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(including Medellin) were entitled to review and reconsideration of
their state court convictions and sentences, despite their failure to7
comply with state procedural rules governing claim preservation.'1
After this ICJ decision, President George W. Bush stated in a
"Memorandum to the Attorney General" that the United States would
'by having State courts
"'discharge its international obligations'
...

18
give effect to the decision."',

As one of the Mexican nationals named in the ICJ proceedings,
Medellin had earlier been convicted and sentenced to death in Texas
state court. Relying on the ICJ's decision and the President's
Memorandum, Medellin applied for a writ of habeas corpus in Texas
state court. He ultimately sought relief in the United States Supreme
Court after the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed his
application as an "abuse of the writ," citing his failure to timely raise
his Vienna Convention claim.19
Affirming the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that Texas procedural default principles should
yield neither to the ICJ judgment nor to presidential power as
expressed in the President's Memorandum.2 In so doing, the Court
wended its way through abstract issues relating to the self-executing
qualities in treaties, allocation of authority between supranational and
domestic courts, the status of international law, and Justice Jackson's
classic tripartite model of Executive authority in the United States.'
At bottom, though, the Court framed its ruling in the language of
preemption and deference to state authority. First invoking
17

Id.

8 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1353 (quoting Memorandum to the Attorney General (Feb. 28,

2005), Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 187a, Medellin, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (06-984)).
The President's Memorandum stated:
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as President hy the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, that the United States will
discharge its international obligations under the decision of the International Court of
Justice in [As'ena], by having State courts give effect to the decision in accordance
with general principles of comity in cases filed by the 5 1 Mexican nationals
addressed in that decision.
Id. at 1355 (alteration in original) (quoting Memorandum to the Attorney General, supra).
19 Id. at 1353.
20 Id. The President's assertion of unilateral authority had a twist, in that he did not
suggest that he himself would be subject to the international law mandate. See John Cerone,
Making Sense of the U.S. President's Intervention in Medellin, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.
REV. 279, 287 (2008) (observing that in approaching the issue, President Bush wanted both to
claim "authority to issue a command to state courts on the basis of an international legal
obligation, while simultaneously rejecting any notion that he himself is bound by that
obligation").
21 The Court used Justice Jackson's model in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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preemption rhetoric, the Court pronounced that the ICJ judgment
"does not of its own force constitute binding federal law that
pre-empts state restrictions on the filing of successive habeas
petitions."2 Likewise, the Court confronted the President's exertion
of power as an attempt "'.to establish binding rules of decision that
preempt contrary state law."',2 3 In finishing off both power issues, the
Court indulged a deference-to-state-prerogatives flourish. As to the
international law issue, the Court observed that state procedural rules
are so inviolable that even "basic rights guaranteed by our own
Constitution do not have the effect of displacing [them].*,2 And state
sovereignty's strength is equally compelling in the face of
Presidential power, which "cannot stretch so far" as to reach "deep
into the heart of the State's police powers and compel[i] state courts to
reopen final criminal judgments."2
Given this bombast, commentators were quick to characterize the
decision as abdicating a remarkable degree of power to state courts.
After all, the Court effectively allowed the law of an individual state
to control whether to honor the United States' treaty obligation, the
judgment of an international tribunal, and a "memorandum"' of the
President of the United States.2 To accomplish this, the Court intoned
rule-like formalism: (1) the President had asserted a category of
power absent from his list of constitutionally granted duties, and (2)
international law unequivocally lacks the clout necessary to displace
state procedural rules. Although such formalist thinking is typical of
separation of powers cases, 27 one need not dig far beneath the surface
of the formal analysis to find flexibility-flexibility enjoyed and
controlled by federal courts. Before embarking on that excavation,
however, I first describe my other case study-bankruptcy.

22 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1367.
23 Id. at 1368 (quoting Brief for the United States as Arnicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner
at 5, Medellin, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (No. 06-984)).
24 Id. at 1367; see also id. at 1363 ("....[Albsent a clear and express statement to the
contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the implementation of the treaty in that
State." (quoting Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 351 (2006) (quoting Breard v.
Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998))).
25
26

Id. at 1372.

See, e.g., Ahdieh, supra note 11, at 1231 ("[T~he State of Texas emerged as the critical
decider of the domestic effects of international law."); Posting of Tim Wu to Slate Convictions
blog, http://www.slate.com/blogs/blogs/convictions (March 25, 2008, 6:19 PM) (stating that
Medellin "boiled down, allows an individual state to put the whole United States in breach of a
treaty, in defiance of both an international tribunal and the President's order that the State obey
the treaty").
27 See, e.g., Laura E. Little, Envy and Jealousy: A Study of Separation of Powers and
Judicial Review, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 47, 110-11 (2000) (reviewing separation of powers cases
reflecting formalist reasoning).
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B. Bankruptcy: Butner v. United States and Travelers Casualty &
Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
By contrast to Medellin, the bankruptcy examples are less
burdened with abstract issues of government structure. Like other
choice of law decisions, however, the cases are nonetheless complex
and their precise scope is vague. This complexity has spawned
confusion about their relation to each other as well as to the doctrine
of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.2 8 For that reason, the bankruptcy
cases match Medellin in their obscured meaning and their potential
for vast consequence. Yet, while Medellin presents a story of
inter- and intra-govemnmental political struggle, the bankruptcy cases
offer a narrative rooted primarily in case law development within the
federal system alone.
The bankruptcy tale begins with Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
and the uncertainty surrounding whether its mandated presumption in
favor of state law governance has any role in bankruptcy. Two
decisions in the wake of Erie suggested that it possessed a limited
role in bankruptcy,2 bu h aw review commentary reflects
conflicting views on the subject. Some commentators opined that
Erie's state law presumption has limited or no force in bankruptcy
proceedings (which occur on overwhelmingly federal terrain), while
for rights adjudicated in
others argued that the state law foundation
30
Erie.
for
role
strong
a
bankruptcy casts

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946), stated that
"[uln determining what claims are allowable and how a debtor's assets shall be distributed, a
bankruptcy court does not apply the law of the state where it sits. Erie . . . has no such
implication." Id. at 162 (citation omitted). Similarly, Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726 (1946),
in Erie ... requires a court of bankruptcy, in applying the statutes of the
stated that "nothing. ...
United States governing the liquidation of bankrupts' estates, to adopt local rules of law in
determining what claims are provable, or to be allowed, or how the bankrupt's estate is to be
distributed among claimants." Id. at 732.
30 The early law review commentary pointed in different directions. Compare Vern
Countryman, Thze Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (Part 1), 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 407,
410-11 (1972) (arguing that Erie does not apply in bankruptcy because the bankruptcy context
presents a situation where Congress has acted), with Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine in
Bankruptcy, 66 HAiv. L. REV. 1013, 1034-35 (1953) (arguing that since the Rules of Decision
Act inspired Erie and since the Act applies in both diversity and non-diversity cases, Erie likely
applies in bankruptcy).
More contemporary commentary has been similarly divergent. Compare Randolph J.
Haines, Federalism Principlesin Bankruptcy After Katz, 15 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 135, 146
(2007) ("Because bankruptcy jurisdiction exists by virtue of the federal nature of the litigantthe estate-the Erie doctrine that applies in diversity cases does not directly apply."), with
Thomas E. Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 633, 641-92
(2004) (inventorying the reasons why Erie should be "honored" in bankruptcy as well as
exploring the ramifications of this approach).
28
29
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Presumably intending to inject clarity into the debate, the Supreme
Court in Butner v. United States3 1 enunciated a preference for state
law to prevail in conflicts with federal law, at least for issues
implicating property rights. The Butner Court's specific language
advised: "Property interests are created and defined by state law.
Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no
reason why such interests should be analyzed differently simply
32
because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.",
In two subsequent cases, the Supreme Court affirmed Butner's
principle that state law controls the substance of claims adjudicated in
bankruptcy. First, in 2000, the Court held that a bankruptcy court
should not alter the burden of proving tax liability established by state
law.3 Then, in the 2007 decision Travelers Casualty & Surely Co. of
America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 34 a unanimous Court sounded
an endorsement of the Butner principle.
In Travelers, Travelers Casualty and Surety Co. had issued bonds
guaranteeing obligations of Pacific Gas & Electric ("PG&E") under
state worker's compensation laws. PG&E had indemnified Travelers
in connection with these bonds, including in the indemnity agreement
a promise to reimburse Travelers for attorneys' fees incurred in
protecting or litigating Travelers' rights. Once PG&E filed a
bankruptcy petition, Travelers incurred attorney's fees for protecting
its rights and filed a proof of claim to recover those fees, invoking the
contractual promise in the indemnity agreement. The lower courts
denied the claim, citing a federal common law rule that bankruptcy
courts should not award attorney's fees for litigating matters that
"'involve ... issues peculiar to federal bankruptcy law."' 35 Reversing
the lower courts, the Supreme Court rejected this attorneys' fee rule.
The principle of deference to state law controlled the Travelers
Court's reasoning. Observing that bankruptcy courts must "consult
state law in determining the validity of most claims,"3 the Supreme
Court observed that federal courts must "presume that claims
enforceable under applicable state law will be allowed in bankruptcy
unless they are expressly disallowed."3 Since neither the lower courts
nor PG&E offered any reason why this presumption should not apply
for attorneys' fees "incurred litigating issues of federal bankruptcy
31 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
32 Id. at 55.
33 Raleigh v. fl1. Dep't of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000).
- 549 U.S. 443 (2007).
35 Id. at 447 (quoting In re Fobian, 951 F.2d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 199 1)).
36 Id.

37 Id.

at 450.
at 452.
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law," 38 the Court ruled that the contract provision allowing the fees
could support a valid claim-unless state law deemed the provision
unlawful. Opening the door for other avenues of federal regulation,
however, the Court stated "we express no opinion with regard to
whether . . . other principles of bankruptcy law might provide an
independent basis for disallowing Travelers' claim for attorney's
fees."3
Through this final caveat, the Travelers Court retained federal
judicial control of the legal principles governing the choice of law
question in the case, just as it did in Medellin. Under Travelers, a
federal judge finding the circumstances appropriate can deem the
federal interest sufficiently strong as to avoid state law regulation.
Accepting this invitation, some lower courts following Travelers have
even disallowed attorneys' fees in light of a strong bankruptcy policy
that trumps the presumption in favor of state law.40 Moreover, recent
United States Supreme Court statements about the affirmative nature
and wide reach of the bankruptcy power may fuel this tendency
to invoke federal power at the expense of state law .4 '1Read together
with the post-Travelers experience in the lower courts, these
Supreme Court statements suggest a malleable standard for the
choice of law question presented in Travelers. This approach seems
to contrast with the formal rule invoked to resolve the choice of
law question in Medellin. The next section investigates whether
these characterizations-standard and rule-carry a meaningful
distinction in this context.

38

Id. at 452-53.

39

Id. at 456.

40 Richard J. Corbi, Update: Postpetition Attorney's Fees Following the Supreme Court
Decision of Travelers Casualty and Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 17
NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 341 (2008) (surveying cases and noting that some courts are
disallowing attorneys' fees even in light of the strong presumption in Travelers).
41In Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006), the Supreme
Court held that government defendants may not avail themselves of a sovereign immunity
defense in a case arising under bankruptcy law. Id. at 375-77. More broadly read, the case
suggests a new robust reading for the Constitution's grant of power to Congress to create
uniform bankruptcy laws. Inaccurate, this reading of the Constitution could restrict or
undermine Butner's deference for state law. As one commentator argued, if Congress's power to
create uniform bankruptcy laws allows the type of insult to state prerogatives resulting from
abrogating sovereign immunity, then it certainly allows "adoption of a federal definition of
property for fraudulent transfer purposes." Haines, supra note 30, at 148. Presumably the same
applies to the deference to state contract law exhibited in Travelers.
The Supreme Court recently granted review in a case that promises to interpret the intended
scope of Katz, Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 129 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
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1I. THEji HYBRID STANDARDS OF MEDELLIN AND BuTNERfrRA vELERs
Medellin and Butner/Travelers hold powerful consequences for
litigants seeking access to a federal court remedy. Under Medellin,
parties with claims implicating international law will have more
difficulty gaining access to domestic United States courts to litigate. 42
Likewise, those trying to assert claims relevant to the Bankruptcy
Code policies, but in tension with state-created property rights, may
find that the Butner/Travelers principle disqualifies a favorable
federal court remedy. Given this effect of Medellin and the
bankruptcy cases, one can easily conjecture about the unstated
ulterior motives that controlled the decisions, but were unrelated to
the technical procedural issues dominating the Court's express
reasoning. One might argue, for example, that the Medellin Court
acted out of concern with losing control to international organizations
beyond the reach of United States sovereignty. Likewise, one might
attribute to the Travelers Court a concern with preserving state law's
preference for creditor rights and freedom of contract principles.
While crucial to understanding the full import of the cases,
unstated motivations or ideologies are not my primary concern here.
Instead, I focus on the narrow methodological question of how the
Court handled the choice of law inquiries, evaluating how the Court
accommodated diverse legal principles from different sovereigns, and
whether the Court's approach empowered or undercut the federal
judiciary. To that end, I use this part to investigate whether the cases
reflect a rule or standard approach to decisionmaking 43 and whether
the particular approach used facilitated federal judicial control of the
subject matters.
A. Rules and Standards
Scholars define a "rule" as a "legal directive" requiring a
decisionmaker to reach a certain result upon finding the presence of
certain triggering facts."4 Some emphasize that rules "entail an
42 Craig Jackson, The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine and Foreign Policy FederalismThe Missing Issue in Medellin v. Texas, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 335, 335 (2008)
(observing that Medellin "has made it much more difficult for issues involving international
obligations of the United States to be litigated in domestic courts, even where the President
orders judicial resolution of those matters").
43 1 am indebted to Professor Craig Green for suggesting this analysis.
44 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Thze Supreme Court, 1991 Term, Foreword: The Justices of Rules
and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992) (describing a rule as binding "a decisionmaker
to respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts"); see, e.g., Pierre
Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 381 (1985) (conceptualizing legal rules as
"a series of directives," where each directive has "a 'trigger' . .. and a 'response' that requires
or authorizes a legal consequence when that [trigger] is present").
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advance determination of what conduct is permissible.A Standards,
by contrast, tend to require that the decisionmaker apply a
"background principle or policy" to a set of facts before rendering a
binding decision about the facts.4 In this way, standards allow the
decisionmaker to decide "[whether certain] conduct is permissible"
after the conduct has occurred and the court has evaluated the
conduct's effect.
Standards implement functional decisionmaking, often associated
with balancing tests and reasoning by reference to the purposes
underlying legal directives.4 Rules, by contrast, enable formalistic
decisionmaking, associated with "bright-line boundaries" and
"categorical formulas ."4 9 In recent years, the rule-based approach to
decisionmaking has gained many proponents,5 particularly for issues
bearing on a court's jurisdiction.5 Proponents argue that rules reduce
complex reasoning and constrain discretion, thereby promoting
uniformity, efficiency, predictability, and even-handed justice.
B. Medellin: A Rule Dissolves Into a Standard
Medellin rendered an unqualified holding that both the ICJ's
Avena decision and the President of the United States lacked power to
establish "'.a binding rule[] of decision that preemptls] contrary state
law' 52 on the finality of criminal judgments. Of course, the Court's
language and embrace of the tri-partite Youngstown test suggested
that the Court would be willing to qualify its position and defer to
Congress if Congress were to pass specific legislation executing the
terms of the Vienna Convention and delineating the effect of the ICJ
45 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 560
(1992). Kaplow's analysis is cited widely within legal scholarship.
46 Sullivan, supra note 44, at 58; see also Mark D. Rosen, Nonformalistic Law in Time
and Space, 66 U. CHi. L. REV. 622, 623 (1999) (using the term "nonformalistic law" as
synonymous with standards and defining standards as abstract concepts that "refer to the
ultimate policy or goal animating the law").
47 Kaplow, supra note 45, at 560.
48 See Laura E. Little, Hairsplitting and Complexity in Conflict of Laws: The Paradox
of Formalism, 37 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 925, 951 (2004) (describing characteristics of
functionalism).
49 Sullivan, supra note 44, at 59.
50 See, e.g., Little, supra note 27, at 107-09 (citing sources to support the proposition that
formalism is gaining popularity).
51See, e.g., In re Lopez, 116 F.3d 1191, 1194 (7th cir. 1997) (arguing that jurisdictional
rules should be "simple and precise so that judges and lawyers" can focus on the dispute's
merits). For an argument that the rule approach is better than the standard approach for
determining which forum should adjudicate a hybrid law case, see John F. Preis, Jurisdiction
and Discretionin Hybrid Law Cases, 75 U. OiN. L. REV. 145, 192 (2006).
52 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1368 (2008) (quoting Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5, Medellin, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (No. 06-984)).
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decision .5 3 But this suggestion did not undermine the bright-line,
formal veneer of Medellin's holding. The Court represented that the
conflict was unquestionably and simply resolved by state procedural
default law, unless clearly trumped by Congress. In other words, the
Court purported to resolve the power struggles in the case with a
formal rule.
Viewing Medellin against the background of existing law
governing procedural default in state criminal cases, one unearths
both flexibility and complexity. Considering the myriad preexisting
exceptions to state procedural default principles in federal case law,
one begins to see that the Court left significant room for its own
control of legal doctrine in future cases. From this perspective, the
Court deployed a methodology more resembling a standard than a
rule.
Evidence of the Court's control appears first in its orientation
toward the issues in Medellin. Not only did the Court assert itself
against the executive branch and against an international tribunal, but
it took for itself the task of deciding whether or not the procedural bar
should be effective. Having decided that the procedural bar in
Medellin should be treated like any other effective state procedural
bar, the Court left open the possibility that in future disputes of this
kind, federally defined standards might prevent a state procedural rule
from operating as a bar. How is this possible? Under the independent
and adequate state ground doctrine undergirding the procedural bar
rule, federal law governs whether a federal court honors a state
procedural bar. Thus, in future cases, a panoply of federal principles
will inform whether the procedural bar stands as an obstacle to direct
United States Supreme Court review of a state crirmnal conviction or
as an obstacle to federal habeas corpus review. 54
In .the posture of both direct and habeas review, the federal court
makes its own determination whether to give effect to a state
procedural bar.5 As an initial matter in both contexts, the federal
court must characterize the state rule: is it "procedural" or

53 For specific language, see Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1369 (stating that Congress could
"enact implementing legislation approved by the President").
54~See, e.g., Catherine T. Struve, Direct and Collateral Federal Court Review of the
Adequacy of State Procedural Rules, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 243, 245 n.3 (2003) (observing that
federal standards for "the direct-review and habeas-review incarnations of the independent and
adequate state grounds doctrine are [similar, but] not precisely congruent").
55 See, e.g., Martin A. Rogoff, Application of Treaties and the Decisions of International
Tribunals in the United States and France: Reflections on Recent Practice, 58 ME. L. REV. 406,
424 (2006) (observing that the United States Supreme Court and Congress have "carefully
crafted and fine-tuned the procedural default doctrine").
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"substantive"? It is federal law that governs this characterization ,6
and the process of making the substantive/procedural decision is
notoriously slippery and indeterminate.5 Indeed, the process of
sorting rules according to the substantive/procedural characterization
is alone sufficient to transport an area of law from bright-line
rulemaking to a process of creating standards capable of endless
manipulation.
Even if the state rule is unquestionably procedural, the federal
doctrines governing procedural defaults include much discretion,
rendering the decisionmaking principles even more standard-like. For
cases coming to the United States Supreme Court on direct review,
the Court has created a complex body of laws governing the
circumstances under which the independent and adequate state
ground doctrine applies. In this enterprise, the Court "applies its own
standards in making [the] . . . inquiry, and is not precluded from
reaching its own conclusion."5 For example, the Court may
scrutinize a state procedural ground to ensure that it is not "arbitrary
or a mere device to prevent .. . review" 5 9 and that it has been applied
"evenhandedly to all similar claims."6 Moreover, the United States
Reports are replete with examples where, on direct review of a state
court decision, the Supreme Court refuses the shackles of state court
factual determinations that could foreclose federal constitutional
claims.6
For cases coming to federal court on habeas, the procedural bar
doctrine is governed by a federal "cause and prejudice" standard. In
Wainwright v. Sykes, 12 the Court held that a habeas petitioner must
abide the consequences of failure to comply with a state procedural
rule unless she shows "cause" for having failed to raise the claim
properly in state court and actual "prejudice" resulting from the
56 Cf. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998) (holding that federal
retroactivity law applies only to procedural rules and that the federally determined "distinction
between substance and procedure is an important one in the habeas context").
57 See, e.g., Sampson v. Channel, 110 F.2d 754 (1 st Cir. 1940) (concluding that burden of
proof law is substantive for Erie doctrine purposes and procedural for horizontal conflict of law
purposes); John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REv. 693, 726 (1974)
(observing that substance and procedure arc closely intertwined); cf Paul Schiff Berman,
Towards a Cosmnopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining Governmental Interests in a
Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1819, 1841 n.1 13 (2005) (listing sources illuminating the
problems with characterization within choice of law); Laura E. Little, Characterizationand
Legal Discourse, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 372, 372-73, 387 (1996) (explaining how the
characterization process creates many options for disposition of a controversy).
58 EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 222 (9th ed. 2007).
59 Enter. Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers MuL. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157. 164 (1917).
60 Hathomn v. Lovom, 457 U.S. 255, 263 (1982).
61 See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 58, at 228-31 (citing cases).
62 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
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failure to enjoy the underlying federal right. Of course, federal law
governs the questions whether "cause"~ or "prejudice" are established.
Moreover, even if a habeas petitioner fails to make the cause and
prejudice showing, the petitioner can avoid the procedural default by
satisfying a federal standard for actual innocence.6 Unlike in other
areas of habeas jurisprudence, Congress has been restrained in its
gloss on the procedural bar standard: the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 left the cause and prejudice
standard largely untouched, although the statute does create special
federal rules for certain state death penalty cases. 64 Thus, Congress
left for federal habeas courts nearly the same latitude in applying state
procedural rules as the Supreme Court enjoys on direct appeal. With
this latitude comes discretion and control, which enable federal courts
to turn what appears as a rigid rule into a flexible standard.
C. Bankruptcy Cases: A StandardLives Up to its Flexibility Potential
By contrast with the apparent rule-like formality of Medellin,
Travelers (and its predecessor Butner) enunciated an open-ended
principle, easily characterized as a standard. Both Travelers and
Butner invite bankruptcy courts to deviate from state law where
"1some federal interest requires a different result.",65 What kind of
federal interest? How different a result? To answer those questions, a
bankruptcy court is left on its own-with only underlying policies of
the Bankruptcy Code to guide its deliberation. The result for courts is
broad flexibility, enabling them to generate a motley assortment of
hybrid legal principles. As outlined above, this flexibility is reflected
in lower court applications of Travelers, with some courts concluding
that a federal interest justifies deviating from the mandate to apply
state law governing attorney's fees awards.6
With or without Butner and Travelers, hybrid law is no stranger to
bankruptcy. In fact, bankruptcy is among the most state-law laden of
63 See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (explaining that federal court habeas
review must honor the state court's procedural bar unless the petitioner shows that the federal
error that went uncorrected in state court "probably resulted in the conviction of one who is
actually innocent"). The Supreme Court also generated another apparent exception in Lee v.
Kemnna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002), when it allowed a habeas petitioner to avoid a procedural bar
because the state court had indulged an "exorbitant application of a generally sound rule." Id. at
376.
14 LAURA E. LITrLE, FEDERAL COURTS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 319 (2006)
(reviewing the effect of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 on the
procedural bar rules).
65 Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979); see Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of
America v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 456 (2007) (suggesting that "principles of
bankruptcy law" would justify deviating from state law mandate).
66 See supra note 40 and accompanying text for discussion of this case law.
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the federal statutory schemes. Many, many Bankruptcy Code sections
depend for scope, definition, and meaning on state law, and-in many
instances-explicitly embrace state law within the plain language of
the statute.6 One would think that bankruptcy courts and scholars are
acclimated to the world of hybrid law, yet confusion still surrounds
the question of how each sovereign should influence the rules applied
in bankruptcy.
For the task of mapping areas of state and federal domain, legal
thinkers struggle with general questions about the proper scope of the
Constitution's bankruptcy power .6 8 For some, a restrictive view of the
bankruptcy power leaves little opportunity for a federal interest to
displace state law .69 For others, the Constitution's bankruptcy power
is sufficiently broad as to authorize bankruptcy courts to create a
common law of bankruptcy, which preempts wide swaths of
potentially applicable state law.7

67 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2006) (eligibility for Chapter 9 limited to entities
authorized by state law); id. § 362(b)(2)(D) (automatic stay exception for suspension of
professional licenses); id. § 365(c)(1)(A) ("applicable law" excuses non-debtor from accepting
substituted performance); id. § 365(f)(1) (trustee may assume and assign notwithstanding
"1applicable law"); id. § 5 10(a) (subordination agreements enforceable as under "applicable
nonbankruptcy law"); id. § 522(b)(2) (exemptions under "state law"); id. § 522(c)(1)
(notwithstanding "applicable nonbankruptcy law," exempt property is liable for child support);
id. § 522(f)(3) (protecting certain liens from avoidance); id. § 526(c)(3), (5) (reference to debt
relief agencies); id. § 541 (a) (reference to all debtor's legal and equitable interests in property);
id. § 544(a) (trustee's strong arm power depends on state law priorities); id § 544(b) (trustee
subrogates to avoiding power of unsecured creditor under "applicable law"); id. § 546(b)(1)
(trustee's avoiding powers are subject to limitations in "generally applicable law"); id.
§ 547(e)(1) (defining perfeetion by reference to "applicable law"); id. § 548(d)(1) (defining
when transfer is made, in terms of "applicable law"); id. § 549(c) (protection of bona fide
purchaser in terms of "applicable law"); id. § 552(b)(1) (reference to post-petition reach of
security interest in terms of "applicable nonbankruptcy law"); id § 1126(b)(1) (acceptance of
plan, in compliance with "applicable nonbankruptcy law"). My thanks to Professor Margaret
Howard for her assistance with compiling this list.
68 See Haines, supra note 30, at 148 (arguing that the Supreme Court has recently signaled
a broader reading of the Bankruptcy Clause); Lipson, supra note 8, at 611-14 (describing the
dearth of constitutional theory useful for guiding difficult bankruptcy deeisions); Plank, supra
note 30, at 647 (arguing for a limited reading of bankruptcy power, under which Congress may
not alter "the substantive legal relationship between a debtor and another party to the extent that
the relationship is not a debtor-creditor relationship").
69 See Plank, supra note 30, at 647.
71 See Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial
Lawmaking in a Statutory Regime, 80 Am. BANKR. L.J. 1, 69-78 (2006) (explaining the
justification for federal common law in bankruptcy). Levitin cites the following three examples
of federal common law making in bankruptcy: In re Owens Coming, 419 F.3d 195, 205 (3d Cir.
2005) (substantive consolidation of debtor and subsidiaries); In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866,
870-71 (7th Cir. 2004) (standards for critical vendor motions); In re Genesis Health Ventures,
Inc., 266 B.R. 591, 602-03 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) (treatment of non-debtor releases).
One might argue that the Supreme Court's approach in Central Virginia Community
College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006), supports a broad reading of the bankruptcy power. For
further discussion of Katz, see supra note 41.
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Bankruptcy's unsettled constitutional status is reflected in court
decisions about whether a "federal interest" ever trumps the usual
deference to state law. Perhaps nowhere are the conflicting responses
more pronounced than in analyses of the question whether bankruptcy
courts are constrained by state law in disposing of horizontal choice
of law problems. When confronted with a clash of state laws
governing a particular question, some bankruptcy courts see the
bankruptcy power as broad enough to justify creating federal
principles. Other bankruptcy courts believe that the rule of Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. 71 constrains them.
Handed down close on the heels of Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins,
Klaxon established that federal diversity courts must apply the state
72
conflict of law rules of the forum state. Those courts concluding that
this principle controls in bankruptcy reason that, when a bankruptcy
court determines that state law must govern a question, the court must
apply the conflict of law rules of the forum state to ascertain WHICH
state law governs.7 Others conclude that, under the Butnerfl'ravelers
standard, bankruptcy presents a unique federal context for choice of
law issues and that bankruptcy courts need not confine themselves to
the same choice of law mandates as diversity courts.7 According to
this view, bankruptcy's focus on uniform and efficient resolution of a
debtor's affairs provides an important federal interest that counsels
bankruptcy courts to use federal-not state-choice of law rules. Not
surprisingly, courts following this reasoning pursue different
7313 U.S. 487 (1941).
Id. at 496. The Klaxon Court reasoned: "Otherwise, the accident of diversity of
citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate state and
federal courts sitting side by side. Any other ruling would do violence to the principle of
uniformity within a state, upon which the Tompkins decision is based." 1d. (citation omitted).
73 Many recent courts have assumed that the Klaxon approach applies in bankruptcy,
without suggesting any modification to the choice of law analysis to incorporate any special
concemns of bankruptcy. See, e.g., Amech Lighting Servs. Co. v. Payless Cashways, Inc. (In re
Payless Cashways), 203 F.3d 1081, 1084 (8th Cir. 2000) (using Missouri choice of law rules to
determine which state law is applicable to the analysis of contract severability); Kaplan v. First
Options of Chi., Inc. (In re Kaplan), 143 F.3d 807, 812 n.7 (3d Cit. 1998) (using Pennsylvania
choice of law rules to determine which state law is applicable to contract claims); Carter Enters.
Inc. v. Ashland Specialty Co., 257 B.R. 797, 801-02 (S.D. W. Va. 2001) (using West Virginia
choice of law rules to determine which state law is applicable in successor liability case).
This view is consistent with language from Burner, stating that "[ulniform treatment of
property interests by both state and federal courts within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to
discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a party from receiving 'a windfall merely by reason
of the happenstance of bankruptcy."' Burner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (quoting
Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)).
74 See, e.g., Conflict of Laws in Bankruptcy: Choosing Applicable State Law and the
Appropriate (State or Federal?) Choice-of-Law Rule, BANKR. L. LErrER, July 2001. at 1, 4
(arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v.
Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946), suggests that bankruptcy courts are free to apply federal choice of
law rules).
72
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strategies.7 Some take the view that bankruptcy courts should follow
federal choice of law methodology, thought to be reflected in the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.7 Other courts have
determined that, although federal law governs horizontal choice of
law questions in bankruptcy, a state's conflict of law rules will
generally provide the content of that federal law.7
We see then two examples of how the Butner/Travelers state law
deference standard has risen to its potential for vesting wide latitude
in federal courts. First, in applying Travelers itself, bankruptcy courts
enjoyed the analytical freedom to disallow attorney's fees-a result in
tension with Traveler's bottom line. Second, for the Klax~on question,
courts have found justification for a variety of results: apply forum
state choice of law rules, apply federal choice of law methodology,
or apply federal law that incorporates state choice of law rules
for its content. Viewing the discretion made possible under the
Butner/Travelers standard, one wonders whether that discretion could
translate into complete control over the subject matter. To that matter,
I now turn.
D. Doctrinal Control versus Complete Control
Upon initial analysis, Medellin and Travelers illustrate reverse
preemption, with federal courts yielding the legal rules applied in
federal litigation to state law. Yet, as I just illustrated, the doctrinal
frameworks within which federal courts will apply these state law
75 Sometimes federal law provides a bankruptcy court with a statutory mandate as to
which state's law to apply. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 959 (2000) provides that except as
required under II U.S.C. § 1166 (2000), a trustee "shall manage and operate the property in his
possession as such trustee . .. according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in
which such property is situated ... Id.§ 959. The alternative strategies come into play where
no federal statutory choice of law exists. The breakdown of various federal law strategies
described here derive in part from the helpful analysis in Jackie Gardina, The Perfect Storm:
Bankruptcy, Choice of Law, and Same-Sex Marriage, 86 B.U. L. REV. 881, 906-18 (2006).
76 See, e.g., Liberty Tool & Mfg. v. Vortex Fishing Sys., Inc. (In re Vortex Fishing Sys.,
Inc.), 277 F.3d 1057, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that federal courts in bankruptcy apply
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws); Novartis Crop Prot., Inc. v. Am. Crop Serva.,
Inc. (In re Am. Crop Servs., Inc.), 258 B.R. 699, 703 (Baakr. W.D. Tenn. 2001) (applying the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws in bankruptcy, because that is the choice of law
approach under Tennessee and federal law).
77For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has ruled that in
resolving a state law issue, a bankruptcy court should apply the forum state's conflict of law
rules or "may exercise its independent judgment and choose whatever state's substantive law it
deems appropriate ...
"Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. of Ga. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co.,
642 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cit. 1981). On the other hand, the Fourth and Second Circuits follow
forum choice of law rules unless an overriding or compelling federal interest dictates otherwise.
See, e.g., Bianco v. Erkins (In re Gaston & Snow), 243 F.3d 599, 606 (2d Cir. 2001);
Compliance Marine, Inc. v. Campbell (In re Merritt Dredging Co.), 839 F.2d 203, 206 (4th Cir.
1988) ("We believe . .. that in the absence of a compelling federal interest which dictates
otherwise, the KMaxon rule should prevail. .. )
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principles are federally defined and thus retain federal character. To
be sure, states may influence case results in both contexts by
changing the state laws designated for incorporation into federal
litigation. But the flexible, standard-like quality of the federal gloss
on the state laws in Medellin and Travelers suggest that a federal
court could neutralize any changes in state law with a corresponding
federal law maneuver.
I do not, however, want to overstate the reach of the federal
judiciary's control of these subject matters. Factors mitigating federal
court power deserve mention. To begin, both Medellin and
Travelers/Butner leave open the possibility that Congress may jump
in, enacting legislation that displaces federal judicially created rules.
One should no doubt assume that the United States Supreme Court
would approach this legislation with deference. This deference is
likely qualified: several reasons suggest the Court would closely
scrutinize the legislation's legitimacy. First, the Supreme Court has
generally held for itself the prerogative of negotiating sensitive
questions of "Our Federalism"-which include choice of law
questions implicating the interplay between state and federal rules of
decision.7 While this prerogative is complicated and perhaps
diminished in the foreign affairs context,7 the Court's tone in
protecting state sovereignty in Medellin suggests the prerogative is
nonetheless present in the foreign affairs realm. Moreover, recent
litigation over military tribunals for Guantanamo detainees suggests
that the current Court casts a skeptical eye on congressional solutions
balancing federal civil rights with foreign affairs matters.8
At least for foreign affairs issues such as Medellin, the reach
of federal judicial control is further circumscribed by actions of
nonfederal entities, such as state and local actors. Scholars have
observed how these nonfederal actors serve an increasingly important
78 See, e.g., Craig Green, Repressing Erie's Myth, 96 CAL. L. REv. 595, 606-15 (2008)
(discussing the federalism rationale of the choice of law mandate of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938)). See generally Younger v. Harrs, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (discussing the
judicially recognized doctrine of "Our Federalism," which is built on "the belief that the
National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to per-form
their separate functions in their separate ways").
79 Cf. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000) (holding invalid
under the Supremacy Clause a Massachusetts statute restricting Commonwealth agencies from
doing business with Myanmar); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (suggesting that
Congress may enact laws under international agreements that might improperly infringe state
power in other contexts).
80See, e.g., Boumnediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008) (holding that the process
provided in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) is an inadequate substitute for writ of
habeas corpus); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 594-95 (2006) (rejecting the argument that
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) or DTA provided adequate authority under the
Constitution for the President to convene a military commission to try Hamdan).
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role in developing law for the international arena .8 1 As views have
changed about the appropriate regulatory sphere for international,
transnational, national, state, and local authorities,8 these entities
have interacted more with each other.8 Events surrounding Medellin
illustrate this interaction. Indeed, at least two states unilaterally
capitulated to the International Court of Justice's Avena decision:
Texas ultimately agreed to follow Avena for cases subsequent to
Medellin,8 and Oklahoma made clear its intention to defer to Avena' s
ruling on procedurally defaulted Vienna Convention claims.8
However significant these examples are in evaluating the true
efficacy of federal judicial rulings, one must remember that state and
local government action cannot literally negate the doctrinal law
promulgated by the federal judiciary.8 The Supremacy Clause
remains in effect. Yet the federal judiciary's decision to incorporate
state law into federal doctrine does give rise to hybrid law that may
itself take on unintended form and meaning. Just as they may nullify
changes in state law, federal courts remain free to modify federal
doctrine in response to unintended meaning created when state and
federal principles mix. In practice, though, the usual process of inertia
leaves doctrine intact unless new developments motivate courts to
action.

81 See, e.g., Ahdieh, supra note M1 at 1187-88 ("States and localities are increasingly
engaged with foreign authorities and international questions.").
82 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues,
and Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1576 (2006) (refraining the
debate about use of foreign law in light of the reality that "[sltates and localities-through city
councils, state legislatures, national organizations of local officials, and courts-serve as both
importers and exporters of law").
83 See generally Ahdieh, supra note 11, at 1192-98 (reviewing examples of "subnational" involvement such as actions taken by states in response to human right atrocities in
Sudan, Massachusetts legislation barring state entities from purchasing goods or services from
companies doing business in Burma, and the events leading up to Medellin v. Texas).
84 See Editorial, Texas's Disdain, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2008, at A16 (reporting that
Texas agreed "to support federal court review for some of the other Mexican nationals on
death row"); Posting of Julian Ku to Opinio Juris Blog, Texas Agrees to Sort of Comply
with ICJ's Avena Judgment . . . But It Will Go Ahead and Execute Medellin Anyway,
http://opiniojuris.org/2008/08/05/texas-agrees-to-sort-of-comply-with-icjs-avena-judgmentbutit-go-ahead-and-execute-medellin-anywayl (Aug. 5, 2008, 12:01 AM EDT) (quoting a statement
from a Texas brief to the United States Supreme Court promising that "'.as an act of comity, if
any [individual subject to the Avena decision] should seek such review in a future federal habeas
proceeding, the State of Texas will not only refrain from objecting, but will join the defense in
asking the reviewing court to address the claim of prejudice on the merits"').
85 In his concurrence in Medellin, Justice Stevens reported that the Oklahoma Governor
had commuted the death sentence for another defendant subject to the ICJ's Avena decision,
citing the importance of the Vienna Convention. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1375 n.4
(2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).
86 See Ahdieh, supra note 11, at 1197 ("[Tlhe dominant position of the federal
government in the hierarchy of foreign affairs and international law remains in place.").
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The result is a blend of legal rules with alternating strata of state
and federal principles. The strata marry over time, creating a new
entity. The next section takes up the questions whether this process of
creating federal/state hybrid standards brings identifiable benefits and
problems as well as whether this hybrid lawmaking carries lessons for
other legal contexts.
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF HYBRID LAWMAKING: LESSONS FOR
OTHER CONTEXTS?
In disposing of the legal issues in Medellin and Travelers, the
United States Supreme Court chose neither affirmative nor reverse
preemption.8 Instead, one might characterize the Court's approach as
"~multilateralist," since the Court integrated the concerns of more than
one interested entity.8 Using this multilateralist approach, the Court
acted consistently with the default rule for preemption analysis, which
presumes that federal and state law can operate concurrently. 89 This
presumption in favor of concurrent power foreshadows not only the
ubiquity of federal and state choice of law issues in our federalist
legal system,9 0 but also the many instances where federal courts have
resolved these clashes by developing hybrid law. Medellin and
Travelers are in fact part of a long history of hybrid lawmaking in
federal courts.
In this part, I first describe other areas where federal courts have
developed hybrid law and explore the distinction between combining
state with federal regulation and combining domestic with foreign or
international regulation. Mindful of this distinction, I then review
general arguments concerning the wisdom and methodologies of
hybrid lawmaking, including thoughts on what Medellin and
Travelers contribute to these arguments. I conclude by examining
87 Under the framework of Robert Schapiro, one might say that the Court rejected
"monophonic preemption" analysis in favor of "polyphonic federalism." See, e.g., Robert A.
Schapiro, Monophonic Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 811, 812 (2008) (contrasting "dual
federalism," which draws strict lines between state and federal spheres of authority, and
"polyphonic federalism," which "understands state and federal power as largely concurrent").
For the purposes of Medellin, this analysis focuses on the decision to give effect to state
procedural default rules in federal court habeas proceedings as well as the decision to give effect
to state procedural default rules in the face of an international treaty obligation as interpreted by
a federal entity-the President of the United States. See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1348-52.
88 See Mark D. Rosen, Conrextualizing Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 781, 785 (2008)
(using term "mulitlateralist" in evaluating preemption questions).
89 See Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and
Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31, 75-76
(2007) (discussing default presumption in favor of "concurrency").
90 See, e.g., Clermont, supra note 6, at 4 ("[Elvery actor, public or private, who faces a
legal question in a federal system must first resolve this question of vertical choice of law.").
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some of the lessons of this study for the debate raging in case law and
academic literature about using foreign or international law in
deciding domestic disputes.
A. Existing Contexts for Hybrid Law
Federal court jurisprudence brims with examples of hybrid law.
Federal courts seem to generate hybrid law without regard to the main
source of legal authority governing a dispute: federal court-made
commuon law, federal statutory law, federal constitutional law, and
international law have all provided a springboard for hybrid
lawmaking. In most instances, federal courts mix federal and state
law. In creating federal court-made common law, the Supreme
Court has sometimes incorporated state law only for its content,
emphasizing that the overriding character of the common law is
federal. 9 ' The Court has also followed this approach of borrowing
state law content when adjudicating issues relevant to a federal
statutory scheme.9 For other federal statutory contexts, federal courts
have relied on state law to fill interstices in the statutory scheme
without explicitly delineating whether they intend to incorporate
state law as a whole or to use state law merely as a source of
useful principles. Currently, confusion regarding this type of
incorporation surrounds questions about successor liability under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act ("CERCLA").9 In related contexts, federal cases have
also manufactured hybrid schemes to give effect to a decision by
Congress to regulate against the background of state corporate law.9
9' See, e.g., Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 671-78 (1979) (resolving issue
of property possession by integrating state law regarding property rights into federal common
law rules governing the legal effect of changes in a stream's location).
92 See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 729-30 (1979) (using
state law to provide content of federal common law in the administration of certain federal loan
programs); United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237, 240-42 (1960) (incorporating state law
governing divestiture of federal tax liens into the content of federal common law in order to
accommodate competing consideration of federal uniformity and well-establi shed state
procedures); De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-81 (1956) (borrowing from state law to
decide whether illegitimate children should be allowed to exercise the federal right of children
to renew their deceased parents' copyrights).
93 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000). In United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998), the
United States Supreme Court left open the question whether state law or federal common law
should provide the rules of successor liability under CERCLA. Id. at 63, n.9. Although the
circuits are split on the issue, several have incorporated state law to provide the governing legal
rules. Michael Carter, Comment, Successor Liability under CERCL4: It's Time to Fully
Embrace State Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 767, 791-800 (2008) (analyzing the circuit split and
reporting that the First, Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits apply state law).
94 See, e.g., Besifoods, 524 U.S. at 63 (noting that many federal statutory schemes give
no indication that 'the entire corpus of state corporation law is to be replaced simply because a
plaintiff's cause of action is based upon a federal statute"'. (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S.
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Similarly, the Supreme Court embraced hybrid lawmaking for federal
tax lien disputes, where Congress had authorized tax liens within the
rubric of state property law. Under the Supreme Court tax lien cases.
state law determined the nature of the property interest possessed, but
federal law determined whether that interest was ""'property" or
"rights to property" within the compass of the federal tax lien

legislation.'" 9

5

Constitutional due process jurisprudence mirrors the alternating
strata of state and federal laws found in these tax lien cases. While
reserving to itself the prerogative of enunciating what procedures may
be due where a state has deprived a person of liberty or property,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly punted the question whether an
individual possesses a property or liberty interest worthy of protection
under federal constitutional standards. That issue-the existence of a
liberty or property interest-is resolved by reference to state law.9
Yet federal law informs how the Court interprets state law on
the matter, often providing federal interpretative constraints that
97
undermine the plaintiffs success in asserting a constitutional claim.

471, 478 (1979))).
95 United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278-79 (2002) (quoting Drye v. United States,
528 U.S. 49, 58 (1999)) (holding that the rights of tenants by the entireties under state law are
subject to the federal tax lien statute); Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 58 (1999) (holding
that a disclaimer filed by an heir under state inheritance law did not defeat a previously filed
federal tax lien on the heir's inheritance and that the inheritance was "'property' or 'rights to
property' within the compass of the federal tax lien legislation"); see also William H. Baker,
Drye and Craft-How Two Wrongs Can Make a Property Right, 64 U. Pm~. L. REV. 745, 745,
781-82 (2003) (arguing that the Supreme Court's approach to hybrid federal/state analysis in tax
lien cases allows federal law to dominate).
96 See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976) (explaining that liberty and property
interests enjoy "constitutional status by virtue of the fact that they have been initially recognized
and protected by state law"); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) ("[Plroperty
interests . .. are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions
are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as
state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits. .. )
In a related context, the Supreme Court has held that for the purpose of determining
municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state (and local) law determines who is a
policymnaking official. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989). This
instance of hybrid lawmaking is analytically akin to the due process jurisprudence because the
impetus for deferring to state law is federalism's respect for state sovereignty, but the maneuver
can result in the state tying its own noose-that is, the specifics of state law establish that
federal liability attaches for state misconduct.
97~ See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (explaining that
when evaluating whether state law creates an entitlement amounting to a property interest,
Supreme Court cases have recognized that "a benefit is not a protected entitlement if
government officials may grant or deny it in their discretion").
Another example of hybrid lawmaking in the due process context concerns punitive
damages. In some cases, the Supreme Court has incorporated certain state law principles to give
substance to its jurisprudence. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21 (1991)
(citing with approval state-law generated Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218 (1989),
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As with the issues in Medellin and Travelers, one wonders whether
the distinct state and federal analytical layers are melding over time,
creating unique concepts of property and liberty for due process
purposes.
And, finally, there is precedent for hybrid lawmaking outside the
usual context of federal/state power sharing. Most recently in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machai, the Supreme Court invited lower federal courts to
use the federal Alien Tort Statute to embrace rules from the law of
nations. 99 Like Medellin and Travelers, Sosa shares a common thread
with the federal common law cases, interstitial statutory cases, and
constitutional due process cases: in all these contexts, federal courts
retained dominance in determining the extent to which non-federal
law influences a dispute's disposition. As a decision implicating
international law, however, Sosa likely engendered more passionate
criticism than hybrid lawmaking cases confined to domestic federal
and state law.' 0 To this issue, I now turn.
B. State/FederalHybrids versus Domestic/Nondomnestic Hybrids
As any regular reader of Supreme
commentary can readily discern, the
transnational legal principles into
nerves. Critics of the practice are

Court opinions and law review
integration of international and
domestic law strikes delicate
loud, if not plentiful. 10' Even

factors in evaluating the fairness of a punitive verdict under the due process clause). On the
other hand, some scholars have found that the Court's attempt to regulate punitive damages has
been so heavy handed as to amount to "partial federalization" of punitive damages law. See
Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 2, at 142 1.
9542 U.S. 692 (2004).
99 Id. at 714-15.
100
See, e.g., id. at 739-50 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(criticizing majority opinion); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A
FunctionalApproach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 154, 170-76 (critiquing
.muddled," and "tentative"); Mark K. Moller,
Sosa's majority opinion as "under-theorized, ".
Old Puzzles, Puzzling Answers: The Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machamn, 2004 CATO Sup. CT. REV. 209, 231-43 (criticizing Sosa's majority opinion
on several bases, including separation of powers grounds).
101
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that foreign law can make opinions of Americans "essentially irrelevant"); Foster v. Florida, 537
U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (likening use of foreign law to "moods, fads,
or fashions"); Roger P. Alford, Misusing InternationalSources to Interpret the Constitution, 98
Am J. INT'L L. 57, 57-5 8 (2004) (criticizing use of international law as source of constitutional
interpretation); Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and
Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty
Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 907-09 (2005) (arguing that foreign sources of law
should not be used in constitutional interpretation except in s~pecific categories of cases); see
also Carlos F. Rosenkrantz, Against Borrowings and Other Nonauthoritative Uses of Foreign
Law, I INT'L J. CONST. L. 269 (2003) (emphasizing negative aspects of drawing on foreign
sources of law in creating domestic law).
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members of the 109th Congress sought to hog-tie federal courts,
preventing them from considering international materials and
materials from other countries. 102 Explanations for the extreme tone
characterizing the critics' message range from psychological analysis
(e.g., objecting lawmakers and judges are displacing their displeasure
with the general course of constitutional jurisprudence) and
fear-mongering (e.g., the practice undermines the status of the United
States in the world) to political theory (e.g., liberal democracy will
die if the practice flourishes).
Although federalism can also serve as a lightning rod for debate,
such enflamed rhetoric is notably absent when courts mix federal and
state law. The Medellin decision illustrates this contrast. On one hand,
the Court went to great lengths to justify its decision that federal
power should not lightly yield to rulings of international tribunals and
ratified treaties lacking clear language executing their terms. On the
other hand, the Court treated as incontrovertible federal authority's
embrace of state procedural bar rules, described as deeply embedded
103
in "the heart of the State's police powers."
The contrasting reactions to mixing federal and state law, on one
hand, and mixing domestic law with foreign and international law, on
the other, is hardly surprising. Legal culture and prcie'0 as well as
constitutional text,10 5 relating to the two contexts are dramatically
different. Traditionally, judges had to master both state and federal
law from the inception of American legal education, but lacked
similar indoctrination in international and transnational principles.
This alone can explain a difference in comfort level with the two
forms of hybrid lawmaking. Adding to this comfort for state/federal
hybridity, federal judges may look to the Supremacy Clause as a

10 For a description of the various bills, see Laura E. Little, Transnational Guidance in
Terrorism Cases, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2006).
103Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1372 (2008).
104While domestic law scholars have long observed the close relationship between state
and federal law, that same tradition is apparently absent among intemnational law scholars
theorizing on the relationship between domestic and foreign law. Compare Paul Schiff Berman,
Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1159 (2007) ("Intemnational law scholars have
not often paid attention to the pluralist literature, nor have they generally conceived of their field
in terms of managing hybridity."), with Robert Schapiro, supra note 87, at 812 (describing
federalism as an enterprise that calls for "managing the overlap of state and federal law," rather
than separating state and federal spheres of authority).
suggest that the Framers
101 h many references to states and state citizens in Article 1H1
were mindful of the supervisory role of federal courts in negotiating state and federal power
Article 1H7references to foreign nations and foreign subjects
struggles. See U.S. CONST. art. 1H1.
exist, but are not nearly as plentiful-particularly compared to the references to those matters in
Articles I and 11, defining the power of the other branches of the federal government over
foreign affairs. See id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1; U.S. CONsT. art. H1.
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bulwark against severe threats to federal identity. 16A parallel safety
net does not exist for hybrid lawmaking that mixes domestic law with
foreign or international hybrid. Finally, the federal judiciary has
historically enjoyed greater latitude in negotiating power struggles
between federal and state governments than power struggles between
foreign and domestic governments or between domestic governments
and international entities. Assertions of judicial supremacy over
complex federalism questions characterize the formner context, while
suggestions of judicial deference and abstention have punctuated the
latter contexts.
Although each context has different emotional and political stakes,
the contexts share sufficient commonality to benefit from overlapping
analysis. This is particularly true for the enterprise here, where I focus
on such methodological questions as: How do the legal principles
from two systems usually combine? Do they tend to take the form of
rules or standards? What paths do hybrid laws take once created? Can
the judiciary maintain control over the course of hybrid doctrine? The
answers to these questions present sufficiently universal matters about
07
legal process as to apply meaningfully in each context.,
C. Hybrid Lawmaking: Relevant Scholarship Strands
Given the prevalence of hybrid lawmaking in federal courts, one
might expect a rich scholarship on the subject. The majority of
materials, however, tend to mention the concept in passing, while
focusing instead on slightly off-topic matters, such as federal
common law and the Charming Betsy canon. 10 8 Sustained interest in
106As the Supreme Court stated in Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), the Supremacy
Clause ensures that federal law is state law, thus establishing an intimate relationship between
state and federal sovereignty not present in the domestic/foreign context. The federal power
ensured by the Supremacy Clause is, of course, moderated by the limited nature of federal
power inherent in the Constitution as well as the Tenth Amendment.
10 o other studies finding a useful analogy between each context, see Berman, supra
note 104, at 1211, in which Professor Berman describes the work of Mantias Kumm as
advocating "what amounts to a federalist approach to national/supranational relations." Id.
(citing Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of InternationalLaw: A Constitutional Framework of
Analysis, 15 EuR. J. INT'L L. 907, 922 (2004)); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking
Outside the Sovereignty Box: Transnational Law and the U.S. Constitution, 82 TEX. L. REV.
1989, 1991 (2004) (analogizing the Supreme Court's approach in striking down statutes on
federalism grounds with the Court's approach to transnational lawmaking); Judith Resnik,
Law as Affiliation: "Foreign" Law, Democratic Federalism, and the Sovereigntism of the
Nation-State, 6 INT'L J. CONST. L. 33, 42 (2008) (drawing on experience with the interaction of
state and federal law in analyzing reaction to United States courts using foreign law); Resnik,
supra note 82, at 1576 (arguing that adjudication must not be essentialized and must instead be
understood in light of the reality that "[s]tates and localities-through city councils, state
legislatures, national organizations of local officials, and courts-serve as both importers and
exporters of law").
"mSee Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n act
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hybrid lawmaking has, however, begun to increase, with important
scholarship generated from a number of angles, including scholarship
focusing on federalism, choice of law, and on courts' use of
transnational and international materials in domestic decision making.
While we have limited knowledge about how the hybrid lawmaking
in Medellin and Travelers will fare, they hold useful lessons as these
various strands of scholarship expand and interrelate.
1. FederalismScholarship
Much federalism scholarship relevant to this Article concerns
reinforcing boundaries between state and federal law, focusing on
such matters as the states' rights foundations of Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins,'09 the independent and adequate state ground doctrine, and
various abstention doctrines keeping federal courts out of the business
of adjudicating state law matters. 110 A competing strand of relevant
scholarship derives in large part from Robert Cover's less defensive,
more upbeat approach to federalism, viewing our system of
'jurisdictional concurrency"' 1 ' as an opportunity for creative
problem-solving. From this perspective, "tensions and conflicts" over
social issues can play out in multiple jurisdictions with diverse
structures.' 12 Building on this tradition, several federalism scholars
emphasize the benefits of hybrid regulation over its detriments.
Among the benefits of hybrid legal regulation often listed are
diversity in perspective, cross-fertilization, and redundancy. Diversity
of perspective allows more than one voice to contribute to regulation.
For example, as explained by Professor Robert A. Schapiro, in tort
law, hybrid lawmaking can allow federal law to regulate "systemic
risks" while state law simultaneously provides "redress for harmed

of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
See generally Berman, supra note 104, at 1159 ("International law
construction remains ... ).
scholars have not. .. generally conceived of their field in terms of managing hybridity.").
1- 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
110See, e.g., Green, supra note 78 (describing scholarship championing federalism
foundations of Erie); Alfred Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 COLum~. L. REv. 943, 943,
993 (1965) (reviewing difficulties posed by searching federal court review of the adequacy of
state grounds); Calvin R. Massey, Abstention and the Constitutional Limits of the Judicial
Power of the United States, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 811, 832-56, 825-28 (finding constitutional
authority for abstention doctrines and the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine);
Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the
Relationship Between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEX. L. REV. 977, 993 (1985) (discussing
the importance of the United States Supreme Court honoring a state court's "plain statement"
about the adequacy and independence of state grounds).
IIIRobert M. Cover, The Uses of JurisdictionalRedundancy: Interest, Ideology, and
Innovation, 22 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 639, 682 (198 1).
2

11 Id.
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individuals."" 3 Cross-fertilization of legal concepts results when state
and federal regulators engage in dialectical interchange. The
interchange can occur in dual litigation pursued in two separate
systems,'1 as well as when one jurisdiction interprets another's
laws 1 5 -such as occurred in Medellin and Travelers. Redundancythe argument goes-allows for litigants to capitalize on the strengths
of different systems and for one jurisdiction to correct errors forged in
6
another jurisdiction.'"
Some commentators take a less sanguine view of hybrid regulation
in the federalism context. Analyzing the specific issues of class
actions and punitive damages doctrine, Professors Samuel Issacharoff
and Catherine M. Sharkey highlight problems of legal instability and
unfairness resulting from multiple regulations on one wrong.'" 7 In his
preemption research, Professor Schapiro also seriously considers
3

1"

Schapiro, supra note 87, at 820.

114See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in
Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 168-69 (2006); Barry Friedman, Under the Law of

Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
1211, 1214-15 (2004) (arguing in favor of a multi-jurisdictional solution to dispute resolution to
accommodate state and federal interests); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive
Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 315 (2005) ("[Dlual court systems can serve as laboratories
in which different interpretations of the same provision are tested.").
While a primary focus of this Article, hybrid lawmaking is not the only mechanism for
hybrid governance. As Professor Barry Friedman has demonstrated, hybrid governance also
arises from multiple litigation structures. Professor Friedman documents how federal
jurisdiction doctrines facilitate shared multijurisdictional structures for dispute resolution.
Friedman, supra at 1232-33 (pointing out the multijurisdictional decisionmaking made possible
by Pullman abstention, collateral review, and double-tracking or sequencing litigation in two or
more fora).
115See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal,
91 HARv. L. REV. 317, 324 (1977) (explaining how diversity jurisdiction explores the "migration
of ideas" between state and federal courts).
116Cover, supra note Ill1, at 682 (celebrating the institutional conflict inherent in the
federalist system). Cover also credited jurisdictional redundancy with reducing judges'
pursuit of self-interest and promotion of bias or preferred ideologies. Id. at 658-59, 664; see
also William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling
Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1589 (2007) (analogizing the benefit of jurisdictional
redundancy to the benefit of biological diversity: fostering stability and protection from the
consequences of shocks to the system).
Theorists disagree about which governmental institution is best situated to manage the
challenges of hybrid regulation. Compare Schapiro, supra note 87, at 819 (reasoning that
Congress is best equipped to make the initial regulatory decision since it "can receive
information from a wider variety of sources and balance the various policy risks and benefits"
over redundancy), with Thomas WI.Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L.
REy. 727, 757 (2008) ("[Clourts are more sensitive to the federalism dimensions of preemption
than either Congress or federal agencies are likely to be."). At least one commentator takes the
view that state courts are the most appropriate fora for litigating hybrid state/federal claims. See
Preis, supra note 51, at 199.
Mlssacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 2, at 1424-27. In scrutinizing punitive damage
litigation, Professors Issacharoff and Sharkey see hybrid lawmaking as likely to increase the
"1cost of policing against any given state's encroachment on the autonomy of another" as well as
the problem of "multiple punishments" imposed for one wrong. Id. at 1423, 1427.
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potential pitfalls of concurrent regulation. Comning out in favor of
concurrent regulation, Professor Schapiro nonetheless emphasizes
its important downsides, including increased cost of compliance
with regulations, reduced uniformity, and lack of governmental
accountability." 8 While recognizing that multiple regulations blur
lines of political accountability and create conflicting obligations
for regulated actors, Professor Schapiro argues that diminishing
significance of "territorial boundaries" reduces these detriments." 9
We no doubt have insufficient experience with the type of hybrid
lawmaking in Medellin and Travelers to draw definitive conclusions
from the federalism scholarship. Preliminarily, however, both the
Medellin and Travelers contexts appear to illustrate both the benefits
and the detriments of federalism that scholars have identified.
Focusing on Medellin as an example, one can see evidence of the
inconsistency and instability described by Professors Schapiro,
Issacharoff, Sharkey, and others. While the Medellin Court professed
faithful adherence to state procedural law (i.e., consistency and
stability), the actual landscape of federal precedent evaluating state
procedural bars reflects a different picture. Plenty of cases suggest
that a criminal defendant may find that whatever may constitute a
procedural bar in state court proceedings has a different consequence
in federal proceedings. 10At
the same time, a federal court
interpreting the scope of a procedural bar may point to state authority
as the driving force behind its decision, thereby avoiding (in the name
of deference) direct accountability for its decision. This creates
shifting standards for procedural matters and uncertainty as to the
precise extent of federal control.
On the other hand, one can see evidence of the beneficial aspects
of the federalism in Medellin and Travelers. Focusing on the
Travelers example, one might argue that bankruptcy courts, state
courts, and private actors all achieve greater understanding of relevant
factors when they view attorney's fees claims in light of
the Bankruptcy Code: bankruptcy courts can fine-tune their
understanding of bankruptcy policy and state contract principles,
while state courts and private actors can appreciate a broader range of
incentives that inform attorney's fees clauses in contracts. As with an
alloy created from distinct metals, the hybrid bankruptcy/contract
principles may be a stronger instrument for negotiating the
I1S

Schapiro, supra note 87, at 823-24.

1191d.
20

1 See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text for discussion of contexts in which the
Supreme Court has authorized federal courts to ignore a state procedural bar on direct and
habeas review.

986

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:4

challenging issue of attorney's fees in bankruptcy than contract law or
bankruptcy law could have created if acting alone.
2. Conflict of Laws Scholarship
Choice of law approaches readily divide into those that justify the
application of forum law and those that attempt to use "neutral"
principles to guide courts in choosing which among competing
sovereigns should provide the governing law. In the past, courts and
commentators rarely seriously entertained the alternative possibility
of creating hybrid principles that govern the substance of
multijurisdictional legal relations.121 As a stark illustration of this
disinclination, early decisions grappling with choice of law in the
Internet even regressed away from accommodating competing
sovereign demands, relying instead on justifications for indulging
forum power only. 122 This insular approach may be changing,
however, particularly for scholarship focused on international
settings. Indeed, scholars have begun to herald the benefits of
transnational judicial dialoguel23 and cross-fertilization when the
121 Professor Berman describes this traditional rigidity of choice of law doctrine, which
often appears particularly ill-suited to the challenges of the technologically changing,
globalizing world:

The three classic legal doctrines often grouped together under the rubric of conflict
of laws-jurisdiction, choice of law, and judgment recognition-are specifically
meant to manage hybrid legal spaces. As discussed previously, however, although
these doctrines are where one would most expect to see creative innovations
springing forth to address hybridity, they have often been deployed only in the
service of sovereigntist territorialism and tend to become mired in often fruitless or
arbitrary inquiries, such as how best to locate activities in physical space in order to
choose a single nation-state's law or court system as the sole governing authority.
Berman, supra note 104, at 1228; see also Little, supra note 48, at 956-62 (discussing
[1]ong [e]stablished [pilace in [c]hoice of [liaw [d]octrine").
"[fjormalism's
n22See, e.g., People ex rel. Vacco v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (applying New York law to regulate offshore entity offering Internet
gambling); Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575 (Austl.) (applying Australian
law in defamation action against United States news provider); UEJF et Licra c/ Yahoo! Inc. et
Yahoo France, Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction]
Paris, May 22, 2000, http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/ctiltgiparis20000522.htm#texte,
translatedat UEJF & Licra v. Yahoo! Inc., Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court
of original jurisdiction] Paris, May 22, 2000, http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/
cti/yauctions20000522.htm (Richard Salis trans.) (applying French law to regulate ability of
United States auction site to offer Nazi memorabilia); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court
of Justice] Dec. 12, 2000, 46 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen [BGHSt]
212 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de/ (follow "Entscheidungen"
hyperlink; then search "Dokumentsuche Datum" for "12.12.2000"; then follow "I StR 184/00"
hyperlink) (applying German law to regulate Australian web page posting holocaust-denial
information).
m3See, e.g., Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J.
INT'L L. 409,424 (2003).
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24
courts of one sovereignty apply the laws of another sovereignty. 1
This process may enable what Professor Robert Ahdieh describes as
"incremental" and "snon-invasive"~ integration of nondomestic legal
principles, allowing courts and other institutions to "internalize
25
universal norms .. . on their own terms."1
Beyond noting the synergy that may result from a bilateral choice
of law determination, some conflicts scholars have articulated an
approach to choice of law that seeks to empower judges to create
special rules of decision in multijurisdictional cases, an approach that
Professor Paul Schiff Berman has coined "substantivism." 2 Arthur
von Mehren propounded an early proposal in the domestic, interstate
context, advocating "'the advantages, in certain multistate or multiple
contact situations, of applying special rules that are not necessarily
chosen from among provisions in the domestic law of any of the
jurisdictions viewed as legitimately concerned with the resolution of
the issues presented ."2 Subsequently, Friedrich Juenger, 2 Luther

McDougal

129

and Graeme Dinwoodie130 have pushed this type of

thinking into the transnational context.
In documenting trends toward hybrid regulation, Professor Berman
has identified opposing strategies that communities might take to
accommodate conflicting regulations. He explains that "communities
might seek to 'solve' such conflicts either by reimposing the primacy
of territorially-based (and often nation-state-based) authority or by
seeking universal harmonization."'13' In the first instance, the
communities build walls against legal incursion, and in the second
124See,

e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L LTJ

191, 193 (2003).
25

Ahdieh, supra note 11, at 1237.
126
Paul Schiff Berman has provided a usefuil, concise review of the recent scholarly
proposals. See Berman, supra note 57, at 1852-53 (reviewing scholarly thinking on hybrid
lawmaking in domestic and international settings since 1974 and labeling the approach
"substantivism").
127Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems: Their
Role and Significance in Contemporary Choice of L.aw Methodology, 88 HARv. L. REV. 347,
348 (1974).
28See, e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, The Need for a Comparative Approach to Choice-ofLaw Problems, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1309, 1317 (1999) (suggesting that courts should look to
whether there is an "interstate or international [rule]" that governs, rather than trying to
characterize a dispute as arising in one particular jurisdiction).
29Luther L. McDougal L "Private" International Law: lus Gentium Versus Choice of
Law Rules or Approaches, 38 Am. J. Comp. L. 521, 536-37 (1990) (advocating development of
transnational principles as the best way to account for "substantive policies").
130Graerne B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create
Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 542-69 (2000) (identifying arguments in favor of
allowing courts to resolve international copyright disputes by creating substantive law that
reflects interests of nations and parties involved).
131
Berman, supra note 104, at 1162.
1
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instance, the communities call for "harmonization of norms, more
treaties, the construction of international governing bodies, and the
creation of 'world law."",32 Because both poles can be cumbersome,
difficult, or politically unpalatable, Professor Berman highlights an
attractive middle ground, which encourages mechanisms for
mediating between the two poles.13 3 The Medellin and Travelers
examples explored here are illustrations of two strategies for
negotiating that middle ground, providing lessons for negotiating the
34
challenges of what he calls "hybridity."
3. Scholarship on Integrating Foreignand InternationalPrinciples
into Domestic Decisionmaking
Related to scholarship that advocates creating hybrid principles
is a rich literature documenting the debate about integrating
nondomestic norms-including international and transnational lawsinto federal court decisionmaking. Created largely in response to
controversial United States Supreme Court decisions,135 the debate
literature rehearses potential benefits and detriments of the practice of
citing foreign and international laws-as well as justifications and
contrary arguments about the practice. Recently, the debate has also
analyzed the role of state and local decisionmaking in transferring
international and transnational principles into laws of the United
States."13
The arguments on both sides of the debate are complex, and I
describe only broad outlines here. Those advocating integrating
transnational and international principles usually echo the benefits of
cross-fertilization, progress, and diversity in perspective found in the
federalism literature. 13 In addition, informing domestic law with
lessons from abroad has been said to serve good decisionmaking
32

Id. at 1163 (footnotes omnitted).
Id. at 1164-65.
134Id. at 1165.
35

1

33

1

1 See Aleinikoff, supra note 107, at 1989 (noting that although Supreme Court opinions
and "extra-judicial speeches" spurred controversy, the practice of looking at foreign legal
sources to aid constitutional decisionimaking is not "terribly new").
36See, e.g., Ahdieh, supra note 11 (exploring consequences of states and localities
becoming increasingly engaged with foreign authorities and international questions); Resnik,
supra note 82, at 1576 (refraining the debate about use of foreign law in light of the reality that
"[sltates and localities-through city councils, state legislatures, national organizations of local
officials, and courts-serve as both importers and exporters of law").
13See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 107, at 1992-93 (outlining the argument that "giving
force to transnational rules laid down by non-American decision makers surrenders U.S.
sovereignty"); Resnik, supra note 82, at 1670 (arguing that the practice provides a vehicle for
"dislodging long-entrenched definitions of the bounded roles assigned to women, men, and
governments").
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methodology and judicial professionalism.138 On the other side, critics
also echo the federalism literature, referring to possible problems with
inconsistency and instability.13 9 They argue that the practice blurs
jurisdictional boundaries and thereby facilitates a loss of sovereignty
and national identity. 40 Some critics also reason that law that does
not spring organically from the people of a sovereign territory cannot
be legitimately labeled as a product of democracy. 141
The cases I explore here provide a discreet, but meaningful lesson
for evaluating these competing claims. As argued above, Medellin can
be used to illustrate potential problems with inconsistency and
instability, while Travelers can illustrate benefits of cross-fertilization
and diversity in perspective.14 2 Both decisions try to account for a
preexisting, complex system of state regulation, and thus represent a
court's professional effort to avoid insularity.143 For critics of
incorporating foreign and international law who are concerned with
preserving democratic values, one might point out that both decisions
flow from the Roberts Court's firm belief in its power of judicial
138See, e.g., Little, supra note 102, at 4-30 (outlining reasons why the use of comparative
and international law principles in terrorism cases serves good decisionmaking methodology
and judicial professionalism),
139See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights:
Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 Am. J. INT'L L. 69, 72-73 (2004) (suggesting that
judges use nondomestic law material haphazardly, even cherry picking those laws favorable to
the positions they are justifying).
'4OResnik, supra note 82, at 1669-70 (summarizing this criticism as rising from an
"impulse to assert ... bright lines of jurisdictional competencies" which derive from the fear
"that with border blurring comes a loss of identity").
In developing her own approach to the question, Professor Resnik draws a particularly
important connection with federalism scholarship. She observes that suspicion of foreign law in
United States decisionmaking stems in part from a "sovereigntist" orientation, which focuses on
how law defines a national identity. Resnik, supra note 107, at 40-42 (arguing that under the
sovereigntist orientation, "law is metonymic for the state"). Finding this approach unsurprising,
she sees its roots in American federalism, which she describes as "grounlded in the insight that
the autonomy to make law is a source of power and of identity." Id. at 42. As evidence, she
points to the two areas examined in this Article: the United States Supreme Court's independent
and adequate state ground doctrine as well as the Erie doctrine, which both police the border
between state and federal law. Id. (citing Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875);
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938))).
141Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131, 133
n.4 (2006) (collecting sources supporting the proposition that only territorially defined
sovereigns exercise power rooted in democracy). i an article relevant to the methodological
focus of the present study, Michael Dorf takes up the anti-democratic consequences of one
lawmaking body's decision to incorporate the law of another jurisdiction in dynamic form,
meaning that the law of the incorporating jurisdiction changes automatically when the foreign
jurisdiction changes the law. See Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporationof Foreign Law, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 103, 104 (2008).
142See supra notes 113-20 and accompanying text for discussion of these federalism
arguments.
143See, e.g., Janet Koven Levit, Going Public with Transnational Law: The 2002-2003
Supreme Court Term, 39 TULSA L. REV. 155, 157-58 (2003) (suggesting that consideration of
nondomestic law avoids a "parochial" orientation).
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review over the questions presented. Once one stipulates to the
legitimacy of this power, one need simply accept that the hybrid
lawmaking in both cases illustrates a natural outgrowth of the federal
judiciary's role in our democratic system, negotiating the delicate
balance between state and federal power.'4
Perhaps the most important message from Medellin and Travelers
for the foreign/international law debate focuses on fear of sovereign
identity loss. In this regard, the Supreme Court's approach in both
cases suggests a calming message. Although actors negotiating state
and federal regulations may occasionally encounter inconsistencies
and contradictions, the cases do suggest that the United States
Supreme Court is adroit at managing hybrid regulation. In both
contexts, the Roberts Court showed that it could defer to another
sovereign's legal principles while losing neither federal identity nor
meaningful federal judicial control of legal doctrine. In the words of
Professor Judith Resnik, the Court demonstrated that "[olne can
without
embrace law as a technique for forging a national identity
45
law."1
national
of
sources
the
of
exclusivity
the
valorizing
Of course, for the reasons reviewed above,14 6 important factors
make hybrid state/federal lawmaking more familiar and less
controversial than hybrid nondomestic/domestic lawmaking. Indeed,
we saw this dichotomy in the Medellin case itself, where the Court
approached the international issues with an orientation reflecting
American isolation and exceptionalism. That is, the Court operated in
the realm of sovereignty sharing (federal law deferring to state law
principles) at the same time that it was seeking to erect barriers
against incursion on United States authority.14' For the purposes of
my project here, this irony does not present a troublesome
contradiction. Even though the Medellin Court certainly did not
embrace international law, other parts of the decision show that a
federal court does not necessarily dilute federal sovereignty and

'"4Berman, supra note 104, at 1184 (pointing out that the democracy critique should
dissipate "once one accepts the basic democratic legitimacy of countermajoritarian judges
exercising judicial review"); see Harold Hongju Koh, InternationalLaw as Part of Our Law, 98
Am. J. INT'L L. 43, 55 (2004) (noting that judges' jobs are not to indulge "majoritarian
impulses").
145Resnik, supra note 107, at 63.
146See supra notes 10 1-107 and accompanying text for discussion of the differences
state/federal hybrid lawmaking and foreign/domnestic hybrid lawmaking.
between
147 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1372 (2008). Medellin is a stark contrast to
decisions in which the United States Supreme Court found a form of "foreign affairs
preemption" preventing state courts from regulating matters pertaining to foreign affairs. For a
review of these foreign affairs preemption decisions, see Resnik, supra note 89, at 75-78.
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identity by integrating another sovereign's legal precepts into the
48
body of federal law.1
The question then is whether fear of identity loss is so potent as to
prevent translation of the hybridity lesson from the state/federal
context to the nondomestic/domestic context (with nondomestic law
including international law, foreign law, or both). One possible
antidote to such fear is for officials to experiment with hybrid
domestic/nondomestic law incrementally, as described by Professors
Ahdieh and Berman.14 9 One can also expect that the fear's intensity
depends on how a domestic court actually might use the foreign or
international law. This question of how law is used has received
surprisingly little attention in the legions of pages drafted over the
debate concern whether to use foreign and international law in
domestic decisionmaking. Although the commentary canvasses fine
details relating to justifications for and arguments against the practice,
less scholarly effort has focused on how courts can use foreign or
international law.'5 0 This is somewhat surprising, since the ways in
which a court uses another authority's law directly informs the
legitimacy of its use.'15' Thus, analysis of how the courts in Medellin
and Travelers used the state law principles bears on how favorably
courts might regard these examples of hybrid lawmaking. To this
issue I now turn.
D. MethodologicalLessons of Medellin and Travelers
One sovereign's use of another sovereign's law can range from
noncontroversial, rhetorical techniques on one end of the spectrum to
wholesale, unqualified use on the other end. Noncontroversial,
rhetorical techniques might include quoting colorful or persuasive
language from another jurisdiction's opinion, invoking the other
148 Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1363, 1372.
149 For ar-ticulation of these incremental approaches, see, for example, Ahdieh, supra note
11, at 1237; Berman, supra note 104, at 1165; see also notes 121-25 and accompanying text for
further discussion of this literature.
I-0Frsources discussing how foreign law might be used in a domestic setting, see, for
example, Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 7 (2006)
(noting that in constitutional analysis, the Supreme Court has directly relied on international
law, used it as a background principle for interpreting the Constitution, or invoked it as evidence
of common values); Koh, supra note 144, at 45-46 (observing that courts use nondomestic
law to identify parallel rules, illustrate empirical consequences, and weigh community
standards). See generally Ganesh Sitaraman, Thze Use and Abuse of Foreign Law in
Constitutional Interpretation, 32 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 653, 664-91 (2009), available
at http://www.harvard-jlpp.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/sitaraman-final.pdf (canvassing
literature analyzing how courts have used foreign law).
51Sitaraman, supra note 150, at 656 (observing that before evaluating arguments about
whether domestic courts should use foreign law, "one must identify which method of usage is
being judged").
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jurisdiction's rule as a contrasting foil, or establishing a factual matter
by using the other jurisdiction's law descriptively. 152 Also relatively
uncontroversial are those uses that simply borrow another
jurisdiction's law because it reflects a good idea. 153 On the more
controversial end of the spectrum are those circumstances where the
courts of one sovereign are actually adopting the law of another
sovereign as authoritative. In this instance, the court using the other
jurisdiction's rule purports to surrender a slice of its own authority to
the other jurisdiction. Medellin and Travelers represent this type of
use. In both cases, the Court suggested-with little actual justification
on the point-that it was adopting state law without qualification.
Now, one might argue that the federal/state lawmaking in Medellin
and Travelers differed from domestic uses of foreign or international
law because the Supreme Court acted as though the other
jurisdiction's law constrained its decisionmaking: in both cases, the
Court suggested that it deferred to state law because-for what appear
to be untheorized reasons-our federalist system required it to do
so. 154 Yet that orientation makes all the more remarkable the Court's
retention of power to control when and how the state law manifested.
52

(manuscript at 12-16) (describing "quoting language," "[illlustrating contrasts,"
logical reinforcement," and "factual propositions" as "Lulnproblematic [u]ses of [floreign
[liaw").
15 n sees this often when one state borrows a new principle of state coimnon law from
another state. This type of use may occur more frequently within the internal domestic context
of the United States than in the foreign/domnestic context. See Joan L. Larsen, Importing
ConstitutionalNorms from a "Wider Civilization ": Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court's Use of
Foreign and International Low in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J.
1283, 1286 (2004) (noting that recent decisions "invoking international or comparative law
sources [have not] explicitly looked to the reasoning of a foreign decision-maker").
154Although the Court in Medellin and Travelers declined to follow it, precedent would
have supported a decision to accommodate both federal and state sovereignty through an inverse
approach to hybridity with the Court declaring the matter one governed by federal law, which
would take state law for its content. This is the approach that the Court pursued in United States
v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 729-30 (1979). In embracing a hybrid approach, the Court
explained:
1 1Id.

We are unpersuaded that, in the circumstances presented here, nationwide standards
favoring claims of the United States are necessary to ease program administration
or to safeguard the Federal Treasury from defaulting debtors. Because the
state commercial codes "furnish convenient solutions in no way inconsistent
with adequate protection of the federal interest[s]," we decline to override intricate
state laws of general applicability on which private creditors base their daily
commercial transactions.
Id. at 729 (citation omitted) (alteration in original). See generally Jay Tidrnarsh & Brian J.
Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 585, 646-49 (2006) (analyzing
the process of incorporating "state law as the federal common law rule"). Kimbell Foods seems
to be an example of hybrid law created to protect one's sovereignty and to harness preexisting
refinements in the law of another sovereignty. That is, the Kimbell Foods Court on one hand
found it necessary to use the vehicle of federal common law to protect federal interests (federal
sovereignty), but on the other hand found it prudent to embrace already existing, intricately
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How did the Court pull off this apparently paradoxical maneuver?
One insight lies in the rule versus standard typology discussed
above. I suspect that it is no accident that, having apparently ceded to
the states' sovereignty over law formnulation in both cases, the Court
pursued a standards-based approach to law implementation in both
cases. 155 As explained earlier, standards allow adjudicators to evaluate
the legality of conduct after the conduct has occurred and its effects
become apparent. 156 By describing the legal principles in both cases
as dependent on changing factors, the Court retained the ability to
calibrate precisely how much sovereignty it relinquished in future
cases implicating the same or similar issues.
At first blush, contradictory arguments emerge about whether
standards or rules are better suited to managing hybrid lawmaking.
Critics denounce standards as notoriously problematic due to
their invitation to indeterminacy, partiality, manipulation, and
unpredictability. 157 From this perspective, wisdom counsels avoiding

designed state laws already in place. By contrast, the Travelers and Medellin Courts found the
legal issues such that the default law with a primary claim to governance was state, not federal,
law.
15 In blending state and federal law in the two cases, the Court did pursue differing
analytical structures. In Medellin, federal principles regarding honoring state procedural rules in
habeas proceedings provided the first, albeit nearly implicit, step in the Court's analysis. Once
this "federal" layer was satisfied, the Court gave full effect to the state law of procedural
default. In Travelers, by contrast, the federal interest could be found at any point in the
consideration and application of state law. Once a bankruptcy court encounters the federal
interest, that interest can dominate or "hijack" the dispute's resolution. In a metaphor to candy
products, Medellin illustrates an analytical form akin to an "M & M"-with state law
representing the chocolate center and federal law representing the colorful candy coating. The
candy coating embodies federal standards for when a federal court should honor state procedural
law and the chocolate represents the state procedural law itself. Travelers, on the other hand,
illustrates a form akin to a Nestle Crunch Bar-with state law governing such matters as
contract or property representing the chocolate and federal law governing bankruptcy policy
representing the crunchy bits distributed randomly throughout. To make the metaphor more
complete, the crunchy bits would have the potential to explode and dominate the candy bar's
taste. This would occur if the federal bankruptcy policy (represented by the crunchy bits) were
so potent as to control the disposition of the particular legal issue. Further cases may illumidnate
the import of these observations.
56
1 Kaplow, supra note 45, at 560.
157See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1177-80 (1989) (criticizing discretionary standards as fostering uncertainty and injection of
"political or policy preferences" into decisionmaking).
As Erwin Chemerinsky has observed in the context of due process litigation, hybrid
lawmaking makes possible greater gamesmanship in negotiating procedural limitation. ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CoNsTrrUT1ONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 2 13-14 (3d ed. 2006). For
example, certain federal jurisdiction concepts-such as supplemental jurisdiction and the
Eleventh Amendment Pennhurst doctrine-prevent a federal court from entertaining state law
claims where certain circumstances are present. The hybrid nature of the due process analysis,
however, allows due process claims to serve as a vehicle for bringing claims with a state law
genesis into federal court. All one needs to do is "argue that the state law in question gives rise
to a liberty or property interest protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
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standards-based lawmaking and decisionmaking for sensitive
power-sharing issues since rules foster clarity and certainty,
characteristics that are well-suited to defining and maintaining lines
of authority. 158 Rules operate as jurisdictional boundaries, demarking
precisely what a decisionmaker must or must not do.159 On the other
hand, hybrid lawmaking occurs in a context calling for precisely the
opposite approach: venturing into the metaphoric legal "territory" of
another sovereign. That territory is likely unfamiliar to the
adjudicator, who will not be able to anticipate all consequences of a
decision. Given this uncertainty, the flexibility of standards allows
retreat or modifications in future cases with unforeseen ramifications.
In addition, this escape hatch might constrain a decisionmaker' s fear
of sovereign identity loss that seems to accommodate hybrid
lawmaking.
Which of these competing arguments should prevail? A look at
hybridity' s analytical underpinnings reveals a tie-breaker. Where a
court engages in hybrid lawmaking, it implicitly rejects the view of
authority as fixed and bipolar. This point of view seems inconsistent
with the rigid formality of rules. As Frank Michelman describes the
process, standards-based decisionmaking allows an adjudicator to
resolve "normative disputes by conversation, a communicative
practice of open and intelligible reason-giving., 1 60 Hybridity
implicitly accepts the validity of multiple jurisdictions' input on a
particular point of regulation 1'and is thus more compatible with the
reconciliatory approach made possible by standards. Rules, by

Amendment." Id. at 214. This occurs because under FEDERALLY created due process doctrine,
"1state law can create both liberty and property rights, either explicitly or by creating an
expectation that gives rise to a vested right." Id. One might argue that a standards-based
approach to hybrid lawmaking makes possible greater manipulation of jurisdictional barrierspresumably a practice that does not serve straightforward and effective governance.
158
Indeed, John Preis argues that a standard approach should be replaced with a rule
approach in determining jurisdiction over hybrid law cases. Preis, supra note 5 1, at 192.
159FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING 13YTHE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 231-32 (1991). Professor Schauer
explains that "the essence of rule-based decision-making lies in the concept of jurisdiction[.]
[Riules . . . narrow the range of factors to be considered by particular decision-makers, [thus
establishing and constraining] the jurisdiction of the those decision-makers." Id.
160Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term - Foreword: Traces of SelfGovernment, 100 HARV. L. R~v. 4,34 (1986).
161Professor Barry Friedman makes a similar observation in the context of allocating
adjudicative responsibilities between state and federal courts. Friedman argues that the
allocation issue might be effectively resolved without a bipolar, either/or paradigm. Friedman,
supra note 114, at 1214-15. In this regard, Professor Friedman outlines a number of ways in
which hybrid, multijurisdictional structures are used successfully to resolve disputes-Pullman
abstention and Collateral Review, to name just two.
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contrast, "block the dialogue"16 2 that is necessary to navigate the
63
competing approaches of the concerned sovereigns.'
CONCLUSION

In Medellin and Travelers, the Supreme Court's accommodation of
competing authorities' concerns was far from perfect. The Court's
rhetoric of deference to state prerogatives in both contexts obscured
their hybrid character and muted their complexity. In this way, the
decisions lacked candor about how the Court maintained federal
control and thus missed an opportunity for effective guidance for
future cases. From this point of view, both contexts illustrate the
potential for overlapping spheres of sovereignty and authority to
become "sites of conflict and conflision." 1 64
Yet closer analysis reveals important lessons in how the
Court managed the interlocking networks of governmental and
nongovernmental interests in both contexts. Through adaptable,
standards-based decisionmaking in both cases, the Court did in fact
integrate competing regulatory claims by separate authorities. As
contemporary circumstances call for a less rigid hierarchy and a
flexible approach to global regulation, government actors are advised
to recall that, for centuries, state and federal courts in the United
States have been successfully negotiating among multiple state and
federal laws. Albeit imperfect, this system of federalism provides an
informative analogy to the challenges of global power sharing.

162Sullivan,

supra note 44, at 69.
arguments are consistent with Professor Schapiro's arguments against a bipolar
view of state/federal authority. See Schapiro, supra note 114, at 300 (stating that as an approach
to federalism, "[d]ualism is fundamtentally a formialist approach to the allocation of power
between the states and the national government" and a "polyphonic" approach to federalism
can accommodate plurality, dialogue, and redundancy").
64
1 Berman, supra note 104, at 1162.
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